Personal Construct Theory, Phenomenology and Pragmatism

Abstract

Personal Construct Theory (PCT) is unusual among personality theories in that it makes explicit its philosophical position: constructive alternativism. However, Kelly (1955) did not detail its philosophical origins. Kelly’s model of the person as an ‘incipient scientist’ followed the work of John Dewey and George Mead. It saw the person as a centre for agency, constructing theories on which action is based. The theory is phenomenological in that it sees personality in terms of the different ways in which things appear to people. It is paradoxical that while phenomenology and pragmatism are now influential in social psychology, PCT (which is in a good position to elaborate the agency/structure debate, so important in social psychology) remains a marginal theory in psychology. It is argued that Kelly’s model of ‘man the scientist’ and a lack of understanding of PCT’s philosophical roots both contribute to this. The article outlines the philosophical basis of PCT and considers an alternative model of ‘person as author’, which brings it into line with the narrative approaches that are more central to the discipline of social psychology.