Do the Right Thing: Experimental Evidence that Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather Than Equity or Efficiency per se, Drive Human Prosociality

V. Capraro, David G. Rand
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引用次数: 117

Abstract

Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.
做正确的事:对道德行为的偏好,而不是公平或效率本身,驱动人类亲社会的实验证据
几十年的实验研究表明,一些人在单方面的匿名互动中放弃个人利益以造福他人。为了解释这些结果,行为经济学家通常假设人们有最小化不平等和/或最大化效率(社会福利)的社会偏好。在这里,我们提出的数据不能解释这些标准的社会偏好模型。我们使用“权衡游戏”(TOG),即玩家单方面在公平选项和有效选项之间做出选择。我们表明,简单地改变选项的标签,将公平和有效的选项描述为道德正确的选项,完全逆转了TOG中的行为与单独的独裁者游戏(DG)或囚徒困境(PD)中的行为之间的相关性:在TOG中采取道德行为的人,无论是公平还是有效,在DG和PD中都更加亲社会。我们的研究结果表明,《DG》和《PD》等游戏中的亲社会行为并非出于对公平和/或效率本身的偏好,而是受到一种普遍的道德偏好的驱动,这种偏好促使人们去做他们认为在道德上正确的事情。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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