Keine Reform des konstitutionellen Parlamentsrechts: Kenias gescheiterte Building Bridges Initiative als eine institutionenpolitisch verpasste Chance?

D. Schindler
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Abstract

Following the handshake between President Uhuru Kenyatta and his main contender Raila Odinga in 2018, the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) was launched to unite the country and improve governance. As a main outcome, a proposal to amend the 2010 constitution was introduced in 2020. However, on 31 March 2022 the Supreme Court declared the BBI unconstitutional since Kenyatta had opted to alter Kenya’s highest law by means of a popular initiative under Article 257 which is the preserve of ordinary citizens. Against the background of this failure for procedural reasons, the paper evaluates the initiative’s most important proposals in the realm of constitutional parliamentary law, i.e. the introduction both of a prime minister and the office of the leader of the opposition. For that purpose, the reform coalition’s own claims and intentions serve as a yardstick. The analysis yields mixed results. While the court’s verdict plainly provides proof that the rule of law prevails, it is more difficult to speak of a missed opportunity to readjust the political system’s design. The executive extension hardly mitigates the winner-takes-all principle that centres around the presidency. It neither shows real interest in more inclusive politics. Constitutionalizing the chief opposition post might be more welcomed even though its selection rule holds potential for conflict. It reduces the stakes of elections by giving greater weight to this office which might serve as consolation prize but also stands as symbol of democratic tolerance. In general, failed attempts to revise the supreme law merit more attention since they are part and parcel of a country’s constitutional politics and, hence, form the background for future reforms.
没有一项议会改革:肯尼亚失灵的建桥布里奇倡议作为制度政治上错误的机会如何?
继2018年总统乌呼鲁·肯雅塔和他的主要竞争对手拉伊拉·奥廷加握手之后,“建设桥梁倡议”(BBI)启动,旨在团结国家,改善治理。作为主要成果,2020年提出了一项修改2010年宪法的提案。然而,在2022年3月31日,最高法院宣布BBI违宪,因为肯雅塔选择根据普通公民保留的第257条,通过一项民众倡议来修改肯尼亚的最高法律。在程序失败的背景下,本文评估了该倡议在宪法议会法领域最重要的提议,即引入总理和反对党领袖办公室。为此,改革联盟自己的主张和意图可以作为衡量标准。分析结果喜忧参半。虽然法院的判决清楚地证明了法治占上风,但更难说的是,它错过了调整政治体系设计的机会。行政延期几乎没有缓和以总统为中心的“赢者通吃”原则。它对更具包容性的政治也没有表现出真正的兴趣。将反对党主席一职宪法化可能更受欢迎,尽管其选举规则可能存在冲突。它通过赋予这个职位更大的权重来减少选举的利害关系,这个职位可以作为安慰奖,但也可以作为民主宽容的象征。一般来说,修改最高法的失败尝试更值得关注,因为它们是一个国家宪政的重要组成部分,因此构成了未来改革的背景。
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