O PROBLEMA DA NORMATIVIDADE NA TEORIA DO RECONHECIMENTO DE HONNETH

Abstract

The text intends to make an evaluation of the possible normative answers in Honneth’s theory of recognition. I identify three major answers in Honneth’s works: a first is teleological, a second is anthropologic ant the third is anchored in formal ethics. I want to show the insufficiency of the first two answers because they are based on contingent elements and strong dependent on particular contexts. The third answer presents more complete elements for the development of a normative theory, or also a theory of justice. Honneth’s decisive point is the search for a  balance between normative and immanent elements, with normative reconstruction as method. What I want to show is that Honneth’s criteria, namely gain of individuation and socialization, need a moral grounding that can be provided by the criterion of equality or equal respect for individual autonomy. This development is presented by Honneth himself, so I want only to identify and problematize the responses of German philosopher. The investigation developed here is directed towards thinking Honneth’s theory as critical without failing to value morality. Keywords: Normativity. Recognition. Axel Honneth.