Editorial Introduction: Special Issue on Understanding of Total Defence in the Baltic Countries

Abstract

Welcome to the Special Issue of the Journal on Baltic Security, which will focus on the conceptualisation of ‘total defence’ and the issues surrounding it. As our authors note, a vision of defence is not created in a vacuum, but is an answer to the changing geopolitical environment and perceptions of actors. This applies to the great powers, but even more so to the smaller states that have to be even more adaptable to the continuous fluctuations of the world politics. The Baltic countries are very good examples of the development of various options for national defence that small actors faced with a much larger potential adversary can explore. The last twenty years of existence have witnessed the experiments conducted by the Baltic countries with various options and ideas to ensure their continuous existence and enhance their security. The revival of the concept of ‘total defence’ in all three countries, separately but simultaneously, serves as a good example of such innovations (since innovation is considered a well-forgotten old) in defence. The ‘total defence’ concept, as Dr. Ieva Berzina writes, is closely linked with the defence posture of neutral, nonaligned states during the Cold War. For these states, neutrality implied a necessity to deal with defence issues, since they could not explicitly rely on outside help. As these states (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, etc.) were less populous and militarily viable than their potential adversaries, there arose an idea of multiplying their strength through societal engagement; this would serve the purpose of defending their countries from possible aggression. The purpose of this type of defensive posture was both to deter the aggressor and, if this deterrence failed, to use these societal capabilities to resist aggression. The end of the Cold war also led to an eclipse of this model of defence. As threats came to be located in the farflung regions of the world and countries became more engaged in expeditionary, peacekeeping operations rather than focusing on the self-protection, there seemed to be little need for territorial defence and even less need for the total defence. The situation again changed in 2014 due to Russian aggression in Ukraine and a more forceful posture towards European countries, leading to a renaissance in the concept of total defence as well. The Baltic countries had some engagements with the concept of total defence through their collaboration with their Swedish and Finnish counterparts after their restorations of independence took place. These two countries had significant influence on the thinking of defence policymakers, especially in Latvia and Estonia, and through them, some of the conceptual thinking on the model of ‘total defence’ found its way into the policies of these countries as well. The Lithuanian trajectory was somewhat different, yet, at the very beginning of the 1990s, its toying with neutrality also led to discussions of a suitable defence model that would potentially be based on the Swedish archetype. However, these discussions were short-lived, and the experience of all three countries during the interwar period led decision-makers to the conclusion that the most viable option for these countries’ survival was integration into Western institutions, especially linking their security to membership in NATO. This vision led to particular defence policy choices, which focused on adaptation to NATO standards and procedures on the tactical and operational level, as well to the organisation’s vision of the strategic level. Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, this vision was strongly linked to the view that the threats for the West in general and NATO countries