The Significance of Article 122 (II) TFEU in State Debt Crisis in Europe

Antonios Vathrakokoilis
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Abstract

It was only a few weeks after the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force that the first signs of the current debt crisis became apparent. Significant macroeconomic imbalances and divergent competitiveness have been observed in the euro area during its ten years in operation. This was the first time that EMU has been called upon to manage a crisis. The response was delayed considerably for several reasons, including the absence of institutionalized crisis management mechanisms, the existence of a no-bailout clause in the Treaty, the fear of creating a precedent and the reaction of citizens in some member states. The existing legal construction of the EMU, following the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, was one of strict stability which did not allow for emergency intervention because the prospect of such intervention would jeopardise the incentives to perform a solid budgetary and financial policy in the Member States. In this context, the provision of Art. 122 (II) constitute a crucial rule regarding the possibility of enhancing a Member State in need by EU or other Member States. According to the text of Art. 122 (II) TFEU, there are three conditions for the granting of financial assistance. Specifically, to that effect, it must be met the following conditions: a) the Member State should be in difficulties or should be seriously threatened with severe difficulties, b) these difficulties should be caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and, c) these causes must be beyond the control of the Member State. The main prerequisite for granting financial assistance is the existence of threat with severe difficulties for the country in need caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. Consequently, crucial for the implementation of this provision is the question, whether the occurrence of economic downturn stemming from financial crisis, may fall within the definition of “exceptional occurrences”, under Article 122 (II) TFEU, so that it applies not only to cases of acute social problems, of engaging in foreign or military policy issues, but also in the matter of an excessive government deficit, and fiscal liquidity shortage. To some, as “exceptional occurrences” are taken to be meant economic shocks, such as serious social difficulties, unrest, foreign policy or military entanglements. It is submitted that while an excessive deficit would not per se qualify as an exceptional occurrence within the meaning of Art. 122 (II) TFEU, its transformation into a threat to sovereign solvency would not be the primary law description, since the choice for the Member State concerned would no longer be between an immediate return to budgetary rectitude or continued market lending at higher (punitive) risk premia but, rather, between borrowing at sustainable conditions and outright default.
第122条(二)TFEU在欧洲国家债务危机中的意义
在《里斯本条约》生效仅仅几周后,当前债务危机的最初迹象就显现出来了。在欧元区10年的运行中,已经观察到显著的宏观经济失衡和不同的竞争力。这是欧洲货币联盟第一次被要求管理危机。由于几个原因,包括缺乏制度化的危机管理机制,条约中存在不救助条款,担心开创先例以及一些成员国公民的反应,反应被大大推迟。在《马斯特里赫特条约》和SGP之后,欧洲货币联盟现有的法律结构是一种严格的稳定结构,不允许进行紧急干预,因为这种干预的前景将危及成员国执行坚实的预算和财政政策的动机。在这种情况下,第122 (II)条的规定构成了欧盟或其他成员国加强有需要的成员国的可能性的关键规则。根据《条约》第122(二)条的案文,提供财政援助有三个条件。具体来说,为此,必须满足以下条件:a)成员国应处于困难或应受到严重困难的严重威胁;b)这些困难应由自然灾害或异常事件引起;c)这些原因必须超出成员国的控制范围。给予财政援助的主要先决条件是,有需要的国家因自然灾害或其无法控制的异常事件而面临严重困难的威胁。因此,执行这一规定的关键问题是,由金融危机引起的经济衰退的发生是否属于TFEU第122 (II)条所规定的“例外事件”的定义,因此它不仅适用于尖锐的社会问题、从事外交或军事政策问题的情况,而且适用于政府过度赤字和财政流动性短缺的情况。对一些人来说,“异常事件”意味着经济冲击,如严重的社会困难、动乱、外交政策或军事纠葛。有人认为,虽然过度赤字本身不符合TFEU第122 (II)条意义上的例外情况,但其转变为对主权偿付能力的威胁将不是主要的法律描述,因为有关成员国的选择将不再是立即恢复预算正常或继续以较高(惩罚性)风险溢价向市场贷款,而是在以可持续条件借款和完全违约之间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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