Physical Protection of Lattice-Based Cryptography: Challenges and Solutions

A. Khalid, Tobias Oder, Felipe Valencia, Máire O’Neill, T. Güneysu, F. Regazzoni
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

The impending realization of scalable quantum computers will have a significant impact on today's security infrastructure. With the advent of powerful quantum computers public key cryptographic schemes will become vulnerable to Shor's quantum algorithm, undermining the security current communications systems. Post-quantum (or quantum-resistant) cryptography is an active research area, endeavoring to develop novel and quantum resistant public key cryptography. Amongst the various classes of quantum-resistant cryptography schemes, lattice-based cryptography is emerging as one of the most viable options. Its efficient implementation on software and on commodity hardware has already been shown to compete and even excel the performance of current classical security public-key schemes. This work discusses the next step in terms of their practical deployment, i.e., addressing the physical security of lattice-based cryptographic implementations. We survey the state-of-the-art in terms of side channel attacks (SCA), both invasive and passive attacks, and proposed countermeasures. Although the weaknesses exposed have led to countermeasures for these schemes, the cost, practicality and effectiveness of these on multiple implementation platforms, however, remains under-studied.
基于格的密码的物理保护:挑战和解决方案
即将实现的可扩展量子计算机将对当今的安全基础设施产生重大影响。随着强大的量子计算机的出现,公钥加密方案将容易受到肖尔量子算法的攻击,从而破坏当前通信系统的安全性。后量子(或抗量子)密码学是一个活跃的研究领域,致力于开发新颖的、抗量子的公钥密码。在各种抗量子加密方案中,基于格的加密方案正成为最可行的选择之一。它在软件和商用硬件上的高效实现已经被证明可以与当前经典的安全公钥方案竞争甚至超越。这项工作从实际部署的角度讨论了下一步,即解决基于格的加密实现的物理安全性。我们调查了侧信道攻击(SCA)方面的最新技术,包括入侵和被动攻击,并提出了对策。尽管暴露出的弱点导致了针对这些方案的对策,但这些方案在多个实施平台上的成本、实用性和有效性仍有待研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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