Differential Tariff Model for Power Quality Management

Abstract

At present, electricity consumers are not involved in the regulation of consumption regimes in which disturbances that distort the power quality can occur. Legal regulation of the power quality in the absence of incentive tariffs has not been effective for 20 years. It is imperative to bring back incentive tariffs to encourage consumers to participate in consumption regimes and improve the power quality. A new method of differentiating the base tariff, which does not require a fundamental change in the current tariff setting system, is proposed. The differentiated tariff for power quality management includes three components, one of which is the base tariff obtained by the current tariff setting system. The incentive component of the tariff, which provides demand for technical devices to improve the power quality, is the component related to payment for the consequences of the effects of disturbances in the transmission of inadequate quality electricity to all consumers of the grid organization. The compensatory component of the tariff allows not changing the existing methods of calculation of the base tariff. Based on the proposed method, an incentive tariff model has been synthesized to involve consumers in the regulation of consumption modes in which disturbances that distort the power quality can occur. The model uses a tariff to pay for the negative consequences of disturbances in the transmission of inadequate quality electricity for the billing period as a control factor.