Integrated Demand Response for Microgrids with Incentive Compatible Bidding Mechanism

Zhenyuan Zhang, Yuxiang Huang, Zihan Chen, Weijen Lee
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Demand response (DR) are proved to be effective on reducing costs and increasing resilience for mircogrid. Load Reduction can be readily obtained from residents by many techniques such as Load Aggregator (LA) and Smart Appliances (SA). However, in practice, it is difficult to make a fair clearing mechanism for firms since different firms have different electricity preferences and valuation on their contributions to DR. To address the issues, with the implementation of incentive compatible bidding mechanism, this paper proposed a novel integration DR strategy for microgrid. To avoid disputes in the contribution clearing step, autonomous quotations based on electricity valuation were permitted. To ensure incentive compatibility, a unilateral double auction with trading priority were specifically adopted, and the fixed proportion model was also utilized to avoid imbalance of DR source in extreme cases. In addition, to address the destroyed incentive compatibility in extreme cases, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism was implemented. For performance evaluating of the proposed strategy, a numerical case with super price anticipator was applied. The result of the simulation demonstrated that the proposed DR mechanism can effectively reduce the profit of price anticipator, maximize the social welfare of each component and control the overall cost in budget.
基于激励相容竞价机制的微电网综合需求响应研究
需求响应(DR)在降低微电网成本和提高微电网弹性方面是有效的。通过负荷聚合器(LA)和智能电器(SA)等技术,可以很容易地从居民那里获得负荷减少。然而,在实践中,由于不同的企业对DR的贡献有不同的电力偏好和评估,因此难以建立公平的企业清算机制。为了解决这一问题,本文通过实施激励相容竞价机制,提出了一种新的微电网整合DR策略。为了避免在分摊结算环节产生纠纷,允许基于电力估值的自主报价。为保证激励兼容,具体采用具有交易优先权的单边双拍卖,并采用固定比例模型避免极端情况下DR源失衡。此外,为了解决极端情况下激励兼容性被破坏的问题,引入了维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, VCG)机制。为了对所提出的策略进行性能评价,应用了一个具有超价格预测器的数值例子。仿真结果表明,所提出的DR机制可以有效地降低价格预估者的利润,使各组成部分的社会福利最大化,并在预算范围内控制总成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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