Evolutionary game of dual-channel supply chain cooperation of agricultural products

Abstract

With the increasing diversification and individualization of consumer demand, the consumption environment of agricultural products has also changed significantly. While many agricultural products supply chains are fully engaged in traditional retail channels, they are also generally opening online sales channels, thus forming a dual-channel circulation mode of farm products in which conventional and online retail channels coexist. Due to the high overlap between the two sides in selling products and target users, the potential conflicts in the dual-channel supply chain of agricultural products have become increasingly prominent. Under the guidance of evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the collaborative evolution law of supply chain enterprises under the penalty mechanism. By simulating the game process of cooperation between the two parties, it is found that setting a reasonable punishment mechanism can reduce opportunistic behavior. It can not only enrich and expand the research horizon and depth of the dual-channel supply chain of agricultural products but also have important theoretical and practical significance for promoting the cooperation of the dual-channel supply chain of agricultural products, realizing the resource sharing and complementation of the two channels, and improving the benefits of the whole supply chain.