A Survey on the Security Vulnerabilities in the Cyber-Physical Power Systems

S. Roy, S. Debbarma
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The establishment of the cyber-physical power systems (CPPS) laid by the integration of the operation technology (OT) with the information technology (IT) enabled optimal control of the grid. However, the secure integration of the OT and IT domains remains a challenge. There are several zones in the CPPS that attackers can target to gain access to critical functionalities of the CPPS. In this paper, we explore a few of such unsecured zones that can serve as the access points of the attacks. The study is conducted by considering the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) systems of the CPPS, whose one of the key roles is to maintain the frequency stability of the grid. As the operation of the AGC is critical to system reliability, attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities of the CPPS to corrupt the AGC functionality. Although numerous studies exist concerning attack detection in the AGC system, rigorous research on how the attackers can target the system is missing. Therefore, this paper surveys the security loopholes that the attackers can target to corrupt the power system frequency stability.
网络物理电力系统安全漏洞研究
运行技术(OT)与信息技术(IT)相结合所奠定的网络物理电力系统(CPPS)的建立,实现了电网的最优控制。然而,OT和IT领域的安全集成仍然是一个挑战。攻击者可以针对CPPS中的几个区域来访问CPPS的关键功能。在本文中,我们探讨了一些这样的不安全区域,它们可以作为攻击的访问点。本文以CPPS的自动发电控制系统为研究对象,该系统的关键功能之一是维持电网的频率稳定。由于AGC的操作对系统可靠性至关重要,攻击者可以利用CPPS的漏洞来破坏AGC功能。尽管针对AGC系统中的攻击检测已有大量研究,但对于攻击者如何针对系统进行攻击的严谨研究却很少。因此,本文调查了攻击者可以针对的安全漏洞,以破坏电力系统的频率稳定性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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