Low-energy encryption for medical devices: Security adds an extra design dimension

Junfeng Fan, Oscar Reparaz, Vladimir Rožić, I. Verbauwhede
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

Smart medical devices will only be smart if they also include technology to provide security and privacy. In practice this means the inclusion of cryptographic algorithms of sufficient cryptographic strength. For battery operated devices or for passively powered devices, these cryptographic algorithms need highly efficient, low power, low energy realizations. Moreover, unique to cryptographic implementations is that they also need protection against physical tampering either active or passive. This means that countermeasures need to be included during the design process. Similar to design for low energy, design for physical protection needs to be addressed at all design abstraction levels. Differently, while skipping one optimization step in a design for low energy or low power, merely reduces the battery life time, skipping a countermeasure, means opening the door for a possible attack. Designing for security requires a thorough threat analysis and a balanced selection of countermeasures. This paper will discuss the different abstraction layers and design methods applied to obtain low power/low energy and at the same time side-channel and fault attack resistant cryptographic implementations. To provide a variety of security features, including location privacy, it is clear that medical devices need public key cryptography (PKC). It will be illustrated with the design of a low energy elliptic curve based public key programmable co-processor. It only needs 5.1μJ of energy in a 0.13 μm CMOS technology for one point multiplication and includes a selected set of countermeasures against physical attacks.
用于医疗设备的低能耗加密:安全性增加了一个额外的设计维度
智能医疗设备只有在包含提供安全和隐私的技术时才会智能。在实践中,这意味着包含具有足够密码强度的密码算法。对于电池供电的设备或被动供电的设备,这些加密算法需要高效、低功耗、低能耗的实现。此外,加密实现的独特之处在于,它们还需要防止主动或被动的物理篡改。这意味着在设计过程中需要包含对策。与低能耗设计类似,物理保护设计需要在所有设计抽象级别上进行处理。不同的是,在低能量或低功耗设计中跳过一个优化步骤,只会缩短电池寿命,跳过一个对策,意味着为可能的攻击打开了大门。安全设计需要彻底的威胁分析和平衡的对策选择。本文将讨论不同的抽象层和设计方法,以获得低功耗/低能量,同时抗侧信道和故障攻击的加密实现。为了提供各种安全功能,包括位置隐私,医疗设备显然需要公钥加密(PKC)。本文将以一种基于椭圆曲线的低能量公钥可编程协处理器的设计为例进行说明。它在0.13 μm CMOS技术中只需要5.1μJ的能量就可以进行一点乘法,并且包含一组针对物理攻击的选择对策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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