Control and Campaigns

Xiaobing Li
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Between December 1950 and July 1951, the PLA helped the PAVN establish four more divisions by rearming and training them in China, including the 316th, 320th, and 325th Infantry Divisions and 351st Heavy (Artillery/Engineering) Division. By the summer of 1951, the PAVN had 200,000 regular troops. Chapter 4 reveals that the Viet Minh high command did not intend to remain in the remote, less-populated mountainous region with a backward economy after their victory in the Border Campaign. Instead, they were ready to move south from the border region into the Red River Delta, the rice bowl of North Vietnam. Ignoring Chinese warnings, Giap planned a “general counteroffensive” for the final victory in 1950–1951. This chapter examines his three offensive campaigns at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe, and the Day River, from December 1950 through June 1951, and explores the disagreements and miscalculations made by the Chinese advisors.
控制和活动
1950年12月至1951年7月,中国人民解放军帮助越南人民军在中国重新武装和训练了四个师,包括第316、320、325步兵师和第351重(炮兵/工程)师。到1951年夏,越共拥有20万正规军。第四章揭示了越盟最高统帅部不打算在边境战役胜利后留在偏远、人口稀少、经济落后的山区。相反,他们准备从边境地区南下,进入北越的“饭碗”——红河三角洲。蒋介石不顾中国的警告,计划在1950年至1951年期间发动“总反攻”,以取得最终胜利。本章考察了他从1950年12月到1951年6月在永延、毛溪和日河的三次进攻战役,并探讨了中国顾问的分歧和误判。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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