Power analysis attacks on ARX: An application to Salsa20

2015 IEEE 21st International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS) Pub Date : 2015-07-06 DOI:10.1109/IOLTS.2015.7229828

Bodhisatwa Mazumdar, Subidh Ali, O. Sinanoglu

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引用次数: 12

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the vulnerability of Salsa20 stream cipher against power analysis attacks, especially against correlation power analysis (CPA), which is the strongest form of power analysis attacks. In recent literature, a rigorous study of optimal differential characteristics is presented, but an analysis of the resistance of the cipher against power analysis side-channel attacks remains absent. Our technique targets the three subrounds of the first round of Salsa20. The overall correlation based differential power analysis (DPA) has an attack complexity of 219. From extensive experiments on a reduced area implementation of Salsa20, we demonstrate that two key words k0, k7 of a block in Salsa20 are extremely vulnerable to CPA while a combination of two key words k2, k4 produced a very low success rate of 0.2, which shows a high resilience against correlation-analysis DPA. This varying resilience of the key words towards correlation-analysis DPA has not been observed in any stream or block cipher in present literature, which makes the architecture of this stream cipher interesting from the side-channel analysis perspective.

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对ARX的功率分析攻击:Salsa20的应用

本文分析了Salsa20流密码在功率分析攻击下的脆弱性，特别是在功率分析攻击中最强的一种——相关功率分析(CPA)攻击下的脆弱性。在最近的文献中，对最优差分特性进行了严格的研究，但对密码抵抗功率分析侧信道攻击的分析仍然缺失。我们的技术目标是Salsa20第一轮的三回合。基于整体相关的差分功率分析(DPA)的攻击复杂度为219。通过对Salsa20的缩小面积实现的大量实验，我们证明Salsa20中一个区块的两个关键词k0, k7极易受到CPA的攻击，而两个关键词k2, k4的组合产生的成功率非常低，为0.2，这表明了对相关分析DPA的高弹性。在目前的文献中，没有在任何流或分组密码中观察到关键词对相关分析DPA的变化弹性，这使得该流密码的架构从侧信道分析的角度来看很有趣。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2015 IEEE 21st International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)

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