¿Coludir O No? Las Negociaciones Entre Brasil Y Colombia Para Limitar La Oferta De Café En La Década De 1930 (To Collude or Not? The Negotiations Between Brazil and Colombia to Restrict the Supply of Coffee in the 1930s)
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引用次数: 2
Abstract
Spanish Abstract: Con la crisis de 1929 y el consecuente desplome de los precios del café, que solo tuvieron una recuperación apreciable tras el Convenio Interamericano de cuotas firmado en 1940, Brasil y Colombia buscaron llegar a acuerdos que permitieran garantizar un precio rentable para los productores y así mantener el funcionamiento de sus economías, altamente dependientes del comercio internacional del grano. Con la ayuda de la teoría de juegos, muestro cómo factores internos de cada país y algunos acontecimientos externos como la guerra entre Colombia y Perú (1932-1934) y la Segunda Guerra Mundial fueron fundamentales en la posición que cada país asumió en los diferentes periodos de negociación y, por lo mismo, en los equilibrios resultantes en cada uno de estos. English Abstract: This paper analyses the negotiations between Brazil and Colombia to restrict the international supply of coffee during the 1930s. After the 1929 crisis, that brought the fall in prices, which only recovered significantly after the Inter-American Coffee Agreement signed in 1940, the countries tried to agree profitable prices for the coffee growers to keep their economies working, as they were highly dependent on this commodity. With the help of the Game Theory, I show how inner factors of each country and some external events such as the war between Colombia and Peru (1932 – 1934) and the Second World War were key in the position that each country assumed in the different periods of negotiations and, therefore, in the resulting equilibria.
[Abstract: 1929年的危机,以及一贯的咖啡价格的崩溃之后有明显复苏,就《美洲杂费签名1940年,巴西和哥伦比亚寻求达成协议,确保允许生产者价格划算并且保持其经济运作,高度依赖国际贸易点。博弈论(game theory)的帮助下,显示每个国家内部因素和外部的一些事态发展如何像哥伦比亚和秘鲁(1932-1934)之间的战争和第二次世界大战被基本在每个国家承担在不同立场和谈判时期,出于同样的原因,在上述每个国家中获得平衡。摘要:本文分析了20世纪30年代巴西和哥伦比亚之间限制国际咖啡供应的谈判。1929年的危机导致了价格的下降,直到1940年签署美洲咖啡协定后才大幅恢复,各国试图为咖啡种植者商定有利可图的价格,以保持其经济运转,因为它们高度依赖这种商品。With the help of the Game Theory, I show how乡村穿行factors of每and some external events如the war between哥伦比亚和秘鲁(1932—1934)and the Second World war是key in the position that每一国家此处in the不同periods of谈判和,因此,in the的equilibria。