Dean Sullivan, Orlando Arias, Lucas Davi, Per Larsen, A. Sadeghi, Yier Jin
{"title":"Strategy without tactics: Policy-agnostic hardware-enhanced control-flow integrity","authors":"Dean Sullivan, Orlando Arias, Lucas Davi, Per Larsen, A. Sadeghi, Yier Jin","doi":"10.1145/2897937.2898098","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a general defense against codereuse exploits that currently constitute a severe threat against diverse computing platforms. Existing CFI solutions (both in software and hardware) suffer from shortcomings such as (i) inefficiency, (ii) security weaknesses, or (iii) are not scalable. In this paper, we present a generic hardware-enhanced CFI scheme that tackles these problems and allows to enforce diverse CFI policies. Our approach fully supports multi-tasking, shared libraries, prevents various forms of code-reuse attacks, and allows CFI protected code and legacy code to co-exist. We evaluate our implementation on SPARC LEON3 and demonstrate its high efficiency.","PeriodicalId":185271,"journal":{"name":"2016 53nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"57","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 53nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897937.2898098","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 57
Abstract
Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a general defense against codereuse exploits that currently constitute a severe threat against diverse computing platforms. Existing CFI solutions (both in software and hardware) suffer from shortcomings such as (i) inefficiency, (ii) security weaknesses, or (iii) are not scalable. In this paper, we present a generic hardware-enhanced CFI scheme that tackles these problems and allows to enforce diverse CFI policies. Our approach fully supports multi-tasking, shared libraries, prevents various forms of code-reuse attacks, and allows CFI protected code and legacy code to co-exist. We evaluate our implementation on SPARC LEON3 and demonstrate its high efficiency.