Impact of False Information from Spoofing Strategies: An ABM Model of Market Dynamics

HaoHang Li, Steve Y. Yang
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Abstract

Spoofing has been identified a form of market manipulation, and it is harmful to the stability of the financial market. However, the effect of spoofing activity is hard to analyze due to its complex interactions within the market and lack of data. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model of the continuous double auction market to replicate and analyze the market dynamics under spoofing conditions. The simulated market consists of fundamentalist, chartist, zero intelligence agents, and spoofing agents where several existing market stylized facts are validated. The results show that in the presence of the spoofing agents and their market manipulation activities, the market volatility would increase, and spoofing activities would exacerbate the price variations. The fundamentalist agents would suffer a loss during the spoofing period but would be able to make profit during the price recovery phase. The chartist agents would suffer a loss when the spoofing agent realized its profit and the price recovery process start, at which they falsely believed the price movement trend would continue. The Sharpe ratio analysis also indicates the market manipulation activities of the spoofing agent would give themselves an unfair advantage resulting in a significantly higher Sharpe ratio than the other agents.
欺骗策略对虚假信息的影响:市场动态的ABM模型
欺骗已被确定为一种市场操纵形式,它不利于金融市场的稳定。然而,由于其在市场内的复杂互动和缺乏数据,欺骗活动的影响很难分析。本文提出了一种基于智能体的连续双拍卖市场仿真模型,用于模拟和分析欺骗条件下的市场动态。模拟市场由原教旨主义者、图表分析师、零情报代理和欺骗代理组成,其中验证了几个现有的市场风格化事实。结果表明,在欺骗主体及其市场操纵活动存在的情况下,市场波动率会增加,欺骗行为会加剧价格波动。原教旨主义代理人在欺骗期间将遭受损失,但在价格恢复阶段将能够获利。当欺骗代理人意识到自己的利润并且价格恢复过程开始时,他们错误地认为价格运动趋势将继续下去,图表代理人将遭受损失。夏普比率分析还表明,欺骗主体的市场操纵活动会给自己带来不公平的优势,导致其夏普比率明显高于其他主体。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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