Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: strict versus tolerant mechanisms

Gilad Zlotkin, J. Rosenschein
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

In the domain of distributed AI (DAI), two negotiation mechanisms (one strict and one tolerant), and a negotiation strategy, for the situation where agents' goals are common knowledge, but the worths they attach to those goals are private are presented. All possible prototypical classes of (non-conflict) encounters are analyzed, and it is shown where the strategy and mechanisms result in stable and/or efficient solutions. In most cases, the negotiation strategy is both stable and efficient. These are two situations in which the strategy, in combination with both mechanisms, results in a conflict (a non-efficient result). The reason for this inefficiency may be the failure to include conflict-resolution techniques. It is conjectured that enhancing the mechanisms with such techniques would result in a stable and efficient outcome in those two situations as well.<>
关于价值的不完全信息的协商:严格与宽容机制
在分布式人工智能(DAI)领域中,针对智能体的目标是共同知识,但其附加的价值是私有的情况,提出了两种协商机制(一种严格机制和一种宽容机制)和一种协商策略。分析了所有可能的(非冲突)遭遇的原型类别,并显示了策略和机制导致稳定和/或有效解决方案的地方。在大多数情况下,协商策略是稳定且有效的。在这两种情况下,策略与两种机制结合会导致冲突(非有效结果)。这种低效率的原因可能是没有包括解决冲突的技术。据推测,在这两种情况下,用这些技术加强机制也会产生稳定和有效的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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