Resilient Distributed Secondary Control Strategy for New Energy Shipboard Microgrid Against Bounded FDI Attacks

Abstract

The application of shipboard microgrids (SMGs) makes it possible to effectively use renewable new energy on the shipboard platform. As renewable energy sources are connected to SMGs in the form of distributed generators (DGs), the openness of the system increases and so does the risk of exposure to cyber attacks. In this paper, a resilient distributed secondary frequency control strategy for SMGs is constructed to resist false data injection (FDI) attacks. An attacker can tamper with the information in the communication links between the DGs of a SMG to prevent the DGs from outputting stable power, thereby causing oscillations in the entire SMG. To increase resilience to FDI attacks, the proposed resilient control strategy introduces a control network layer interconnected with the original data transmission layer to form a hierarchical communication network. By setting the SMG parameters, the proposed strategy can well reduce the negative effects of FDI attacks on DGs and ensure the stable operation of SMGs. Finally, the simulation results verify the effectiveness of the strategy.