Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and Carriers

R. Frieden
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Wireless operators in most nations qualify for streamlined regulation when providing telecommunications services and even less government oversight when providing information services, entertainment and electronic publishing. In the United States, Congressional legislation, real or perceived competition and regulator discomfort with ventures that provide both regulated and largely unregulated services contribute to the view that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has no significant regulatory mandate to safeguard the public interest. Such a hands off approach made sense when cellular telephone carriers primarily offered voice and text messaging services in a marketplace with six or more facilities-based competitors in most metropolitan areas. However the wireless industry has become significantly more concentrated even as wireless networking increasingly serves as a key medium for accessing a broad array of information, communications and entertainment ("ICE") services. As wireless ventures plan and install next generation networks ("NGNs"), these carriers expect to offer a diverse array of ICE services, including Internet access, free from common carrier regulatory responsibilities that still apply to telecommunications services. Wireless carrier managers reject the need for governments to ensure consumers safeguards such as nondiscriminatory access and separating the sale of radiotelephone handsets from carrier services. Critics of wireless regulation claim that government-imposed obligations would create disincentives for NGN investment and have no place in a competitive marketplace.This article will examine the costs and benefits of government-imposed rules that would require wireless carriers to separate sales of handsets from service subscriptions and to comply with network neutrality rules designed to ensure nondiscriminatory access to content. The article will assess the rights of both wireless subscribers and carriers to control how handsets attach to networks and what services the handsets can access. The article will consider whether wireless network access should parallel long established rules for wired networks and will compare wireless network neutrality issues with a preexisting debate about neutral Internet access via wired networks. For example, wireless network neutrality includes consideration of separating Internet access equipment from Internet services, an unbundling principle established for wired networks decades ago. Because wireless carriers package subsidized handset sales often with a blend of ICE services and consumers welcome the opportunity to use and replace increasingly sophisticated handsets, regulators have refrained from ordering handset unbundling. But for other services, such as cable television, the FCC has pursued public safeguards that attempt to allow consumers the opportunity to access only desired content using least cost equipment options. The article also examines why wireless carriers could avoid becoming involved in a network neutrality debate for several years, despite the fact that their common carrier status, vis a vis voice services, provides a statutorily supported basis for imposing nondiscrimination responsibilities. The article concludes that the rising importance of wireless networking for most ICE services and growing consumer disenchantment with carrier-imposed restrictions on handset versatility and wireless network access will trigger closer regulatory scrutiny of the public interest benefits accruing from wireless network neutrality.
持有手机:评估无线手机所有者和运营商的权利
大多数国家的无线运营商在提供电信服务时都有资格获得简化的监管,而在提供信息服务、娱乐和电子出版时,政府监管就更少了。在美国,国会立法、实际或感知的竞争以及监管机构对既提供受监管服务又提供基本上不受监管服务的企业的不满,导致人们认为联邦通信委员会(“FCC”)没有维护公共利益的重要监管授权。当移动电话运营商主要提供语音和文本信息服务时,这种不干涉的做法是有道理的,因为在大多数大都市地区,市场上有六个或更多的竞争对手。然而,尽管无线网络日益成为获取广泛的信息、通信和娱乐(“ICE”)服务的关键媒介,但无线行业已经明显变得更加集中。随着无线企业计划和安装下一代网络(“ngn”),这些运营商希望提供各种各样的ICE服务,包括互联网接入,而不受仍然适用于电信服务的普通运营商监管责任的约束。无线运营商管理人员不认为政府有必要确保消费者的安全保障,比如不受歧视的接入,以及将无线电话手机的销售与运营商服务分开。无线监管的批评者声称,政府强加的义务将阻碍下一代网络的投资,在竞争激烈的市场中没有立足之地。本文将考察政府强制规定的成本和收益,这些规定将要求无线运营商将手机销售与服务订阅分开,并遵守旨在确保非歧视性访问内容的网络中立规则。这篇文章将评估无线用户和运营商控制手机如何接入网络以及手机可以访问哪些服务的权利。本文将考虑无线网络接入是否应该与有线网络长期建立的规则平行,并将无线网络中立性问题与通过有线网络进行中立互联网接入的先前存在的辩论进行比较。例如,无线网络中立性包括考虑将互联网接入设备从互联网服务中分离出来,这是几十年前为有线网络建立的一种分拆原则。由于无线运营商在销售补贴手机时,通常会将各种ICE服务捆绑在一起,而消费者也乐于有机会使用和更换日益复杂的手机,因此监管机构一直没有下令对手机进行分拆。但对于有线电视等其他服务,FCC一直在寻求公共保障措施,试图让消费者有机会只使用成本最低的设备选项访问他们想要的内容。这篇文章还探讨了为什么无线运营商可以避免卷入网络中立性的争论好几年,尽管事实上他们的公共运营商地位,相对于语音服务,提供了一个法律支持的基础,以施加非歧视责任。文章的结论是,无线网络对大多数ICE服务的重要性日益提高,消费者对运营商对手机多功能性和无线网络接入的限制越来越不抱幻想,这将引发对无线网络中立性所带来的公共利益利益的更密切的监管审查。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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