Pure pallets : effectiveness and efficiency impacts on the defense transportation system

Abstract

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the official policy or positions of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. BACKGROUND Initial analyses show that the defense transportation system has not yet fully learned the logistics lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. A December 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report investigating the preliminary effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom identified what it termed as "substantial logistics support problems" (Solis 2003). In particular, the GAO identified "[i]nsufficient and ineffective theater distribution capability" as a major problem. They state "[t]he distribution of supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets had to be separated and repackaged several times for delivery to multiple units in different locations" (Solis, 2003, p. 3). In 1993, the defense transportation system stakeholders also recognized that improvements to the supply chain were critical to expedite the flow of material to the warfighter and to relieve congestion at the aerial ports of debarkation during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Kuntz, 2004). Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, improvements in the supply chain focused primarily on the link between the factory and the ports of debarkation. The rapid movements by combat forces during the Iraq war taught military logisticians the critical need to streamline the flow from the debarkation ports to the warfighter--"the last tactical mile" as well (Bivona et al., 2004, p. 76). Establishing the Pure Pallet Process In July 2003, a Defense Distribution Center representative visited Kuwait to review Central Command's distribution system and assist in identifying areas of improvement. It was discovered that the method employed to consolidate material and build pallets in the U.S.-based consolidation and containerization points was creating a substantial backlog of pallets upon arrival at the debarkation ports and theater distribution center due to the high volume of material and excessive handling requirements of pallets arriving into the theater. An important consequence of the saturation was the substantial increase in the warfighter's wait time for supplies at the "point of the spear" (Hornung, 2004). A more alarming concern was that soldiers were unnecessarily being placed in harm's way--the process of breaking down, sorting, and rebuilding pallets made soldiers vulnerable to attack (Diamond, 2004; Imberi, 2004; Merriweather, 2005). In October 2003, Defense Distribution Center staff sponsored a meeting among the defense transportation system supply chain stake-holders. The team determined that requisitioned material should be held as far back in the supply chain as possible where the infrastructure was in place to efficiently hold and consolidate it. The ideal locations to position the cargo were determined to be the U.S.-based containerization points: the Defense Distribution Depot Susque-hanna, the Defense Distribution Depot Red River, and the Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin (Hornung, 2004). The team also elected to build the consolidated material at the containerization points into end-user specific pallets called pure pallets. By consolidating material into pure pallets, the material would flow to the warfighter without being broken-down en route. This is unlike the historical process, which was based on break-bulk pallets that were broken down in-theater and the material sorted and re-palletized before being moved forward to the warfighter (Kuntz, 2004). This new approach seemed logical--the open desert environment and chronic lack of personnel certified to build air pallets made the theater distribution centers better suited for pallet cross-docking than for break-bulk activities and pallet construction. Air Mobility Command's Air Transportation Division planners then defined a pure pallet as ". …