{"title":"Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law","authors":"M. Schmitt","doi":"10.1163/9789004423169_003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the \"jus ad bellum,\" that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7","PeriodicalId":440409,"journal":{"name":"Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Volume 32 (2002)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"28","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Volume 32 (2002)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004423169_003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Abstract
Abstract : In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the "jus ad bellum," that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7
摘要:在本文中,迈克尔·施密特(Michael Schmitt)探讨了在“战争法”(jus ad bellum)下对基地组织和塔利班发动袭击的合法性。“战争法”是国际法的一个组成部分,它规定了一个国家何时可以将武力作为国家政策的工具。虽然各国过去曾开展过军事反恐行动,但“持久自由行动”的规模和范围可能标志着防御恐怖主义的战略发生了巨大变化。本文探讨了反恐行动的规范限制。具体地说,受害国在什么情况下可以对恐怖主义行为作出强制反应?对谁?什么时候?严重到什么程度?能维持多久?作者认为,对基地组织的攻击是对个人和集体防卫权利的合法行使。他们是必要的和相称的,一旦塔利班拒绝服从美国和联合国的要求交出在阿富汗的恐怖分子,联军进入阿富汗以结束正在进行的基地组织恐怖活动是合法的。然而,对塔利班的攻击不太符合对国际法的传统理解。虽然塔利班显然违反了不允许其领土被用作恐怖分子庇护所的法律义务,但作者认为,塔利班与基地组织之间关系的程度和性质可能并不足以将9月11日的袭击归咎于塔利班,因此根据传统的国际法理解,不允许对他们进行自卫打击。因此,这些袭击是非法的吗?不一定。在过去半个世纪中,国际社会对有关国家使用武力的国际法的理解一直在不断演变。作者提出的标准可能会推动未来对反恐行动合法性的评估