Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility?

Yongtae Kim, M. Park, Benson Wier
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引用次数: 1142

Abstract

Socially responsible firms are believed to behave in a responsible manner to restrict earnings management and thus deliver more reliable and transparent financial information to investors. We test this hypothesis by predicting a higher quality of financial reporting for socially responsible firms in the Korean market. The entire sample analysis provides evidence for the hypothesis in the use of discretionary accruals as proxy variables for the quality of financial reporting. However, our sub-sample analysis indicates that such weak support is driven by a group of environmentally sensitive firms and the affiliates of large family-owned conglomerates, or chaebol. Socially responsible firms are less likely to be involved with earnings management in the group of non-environmentally sensitive industries and non-chaebol affiliates. These firms provide a better quality of financial reporting in terms of both the use of discretionary accruals and real activity manipulations. In line with recent studies, our findings suggest that ethical concerns in producing high-quality financial reports rely significantly on firm characteristics.
盈余质量与企业社会责任有关吗?
社会责任公司被认为以负责任的方式行事,限制盈余管理,从而向投资者提供更可靠和透明的财务信息。我们通过预测韩国市场社会责任公司的财务报告质量更高来检验这一假设。整个样本分析提供了证据的假设在使用可自由支配应计项目作为代理变量的财务报告的质量。然而,我们的子样本分析表明,这种弱支持是由一群对环境敏感的公司和大型家族企业集团或财阀的附属公司驱动的。在非环境敏感行业和非财阀附属公司中,社会责任公司参与盈余管理的可能性较小。这些公司在使用可自由支配的应计项目和实际活动操纵方面提供了更好的财务报告质量。与最近的研究一致,我们的研究结果表明,制作高质量财务报告的伦理问题在很大程度上依赖于公司特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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