Disability, Justice and Freedom as Non-Domination

Abstract

Disability scholars have recently proposed that republican theory is relevant to think about justice in relation to disability. Following in their footsteps, this article submits that the republican conception of freedom as non-domination provides a fresh angle to legitimise disability rights in terms of justice and prevent their interpretation as charity or privileges. This proposition takes its point of departure in Nancy J. Hirschmann’s claim that freedom rather than distributive justice should be the bedrock of disability rights and in Philip Pettit’s conceptualisation of republican freedom as a distinct type of freedom. The article proceeds with a consideration of how claims of justice built on freedom as non-domination fare compared to two other foundations of justice that are commonly invoked in relation to disability rights – namely, equality and our shared vulnerability. Finally, the article suggests that republican theory opens new avenues of inquiry in disability studies and outlines a research agenda.