Controlling Shareholder's Equity Pledge and Corporate R&D Investment

Abstract

In recent years, the controlling shareholder pledge of listed companies has become a common phenomenon in China's capital market. This paper taking the non-financial enterprises listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets as samples from 2013 to 2017, studies the influence of the controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the R&D investment level of enterprises, and adds earnings management as a moderating variable. The empirical research shows that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior will significantly reduce the level of R&D investment; the higher the quality of earnings management as a regulatory variable, the greater the negative effect of the large shareholder equity pledge on the R&D investment level of the enterprise. The article, expanding the existing research perspective, is of great significance for controlling company risks and promoting the long-term development of listed companies. Keywords—controlling shareholder; equity pledge; earnings management; R&D investment