The Museum Pass Game and its Value Revisited

A. Estévez-Fernández, P. Borm, H. Hamers
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper is a reaction on Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).It reconsiders the problem where a group of museums offer a pass such that the owner can visit these museums an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time.The problem addressed is how to share the total joint income of this pass system among the museums.Ginsburgh and Zang propose to use the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game.Arguments are provided to model this problem within the framework of bankruptcy problems.
博物馆通行证游戏及其价值重新审视
本文是对Ginsburgh and Zang(2003)的一种反应。它重新考虑了一组博物馆提供通行证的问题,这样的所有者可以在固定的时间内无限次地参观这些博物馆。解决的问题是如何在博物馆之间分享这种通行证制度的总收入。Ginsburgh和Zang建议使用关联合作博弈的Shapley值。提出了在破产问题的框架内对这一问题进行建模的论点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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