Optimal Reinsurance with Multiple Reinsurers: Distortion Risk Measures, Distortion Premium Principles, and Heterogeneous Beliefs

Abstract

Abstract This paper unifies the work on multiple reinsurers, distortion risk measures, premium budgets, and heterogeneous beliefs. An insurer minimizes a distortion risk measure, while seeking reinsurance with finitely many reinsurers. The reinsurers use distortion premium principles, and they are allowed to have heterogeneous beliefs regarding the underlying probability distribution. We provide a characterization of optimal reinsurance indemnities, and we show that they are of a layer-insurance type. This is done both with and without a budget constraint, i.e., an upper bound constraint on the aggregate premium. Moreover, the optimal reinsurance indemnities enable us to identify a representative reinsurer in both situations. Finally, two examples with the Conditional Value-at-Risk illustrate our results.