3DFed: Adaptive and Extensible Framework for Covert Backdoor Attack in Federated Learning

Haoyang Li, Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu, Jin Li, Leixia Wang, Chengfang Fang, Jie Shi
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL), the de-facto distributed machine learning paradigm that locally trains datasets at individual devices, is vulnerable to backdoor model poisoning attacks. By compromising or impersonating those devices, an attacker can upload crafted malicious model updates to manipulate the global model with backdoor behavior upon attacker-specified triggers. However, existing backdoor attacks require more information on the victim FL system beyond a practical black-box setting. Furthermore, they are often specialized to optimize for a single objective, which becomes ineffective as modern FL systems tend to adopt in-depth defense that detects backdoor models from different perspectives. Motivated by these concerns, in this paper, we propose 3DFed, an adaptive, extensible, and multi-layered framework to launch covert FL backdoor attacks in a black-box setting. 3DFed sports three evasion modules that camouflage backdoor models: backdoor training with constrained loss, noise mask, and decoy model. By implanting indicators into a backdoor model, 3DFed can obtain the attack feedback in the previous epoch from the global model and dynamically adjust the hyper-parameters of these backdoor evasion modules. Through extensive experimental results, we show that when all its components work together, 3DFed can evade the detection of all state-of-the-art FL backdoor defenses, including Deepsight, Foolsgold, FLAME, FL-Detector, and RFLBAT. New evasion modules can also be incorporated in 3DFed in the future as it is an extensible framework.
3DFed:联邦学习中隐蔽后门攻击的自适应可扩展框架
联邦学习(FL)是一种事实上的分布式机器学习范式,它在单个设备上本地训练数据集,很容易受到后门模型中毒攻击。通过破坏或模拟这些设备,攻击者可以上传精心制作的恶意模型更新,以便在攻击者指定的触发器上使用后门行为操纵全局模型。然而,现有的后门攻击需要更多关于受害者FL系统的信息,而不仅仅是一个实际的黑盒设置。此外,它们通常专门针对单个目标进行优化,这变得无效,因为现代FL系统倾向于采用深度防御,从不同的角度检测后门模型。出于这些考虑,在本文中,我们提出了3DFed,这是一个自适应的,可扩展的多层框架,用于在黑盒设置中发起隐蔽的FL后门攻击。3DFed运动了三个伪装后门模型的逃避模块:带约束损失的后门训练、噪声掩模和诱饵模型。通过在后门模型中植入指标,3DFed可以从全局模型中获得前一时期的攻击反馈,并动态调整这些后门规避模块的超参数。通过广泛的实验结果,我们表明,当所有组件协同工作时,3DFed可以逃避所有最先进的FL后门防御的检测,包括Deepsight, Foolsgold, FLAME, FL- detector和RFLBAT。由于3DFed是一个可扩展的框架,未来还可以将新的规避模块纳入3DFed。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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