Five Years Anniversary Since Renminbi was Included in the SDR Basket: Results and Prospects

A. Polivach
{"title":"Five Years Anniversary Since Renminbi was Included in the SDR Basket: Results and Prospects","authors":"A. Polivach","doi":"10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-6-59-70","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Received 29.01.2021. The renminbi was included in the SDR basket from October 2016. In that time there were a lot of doubts about whether the renminbi was enough freely used currency to comply with the criteria of such inclusion. Other opinions focused on possibility that this inclusion would boost international usage of the renminbi. The author analyses statistics and comes to conclusion that the maximum boost of the renminbi usage was achieved right before the inclusion. The China’s statistics shows the boost of renminbi usage in the external transactions in 2016–2020, but statistics of its trading partners and SWIFT reveal only moderate growth or even stagnation in this period. One of explanation of this discrepancy may be that despite Chinese banks’ substantially increased external lending in renminbi in recent years, it looks that banks actually do not transfer renminbi abroad to borrowers. Banks just remit these sums to Chinese suppliers under the instructions by foreign borrowers. Then those borrowers repay those renminbi loans most likely in dollars. So China’s statistics record boost of renminbi usage, but its trading partners do not see those renminbi. The key obstacle for widening international usage of renminbi is remaining restrictions (formal and informal) for transactions under the financial account of China’s balance of payments. The author considers prospects of increasing the international role of the renminbi and comes to conclusion that it is likely that China is afraid of liberalisation of its financial accounts because there is a risk of long-term depreciation of the renminbi. Contrary to widely popular belief that China stands for and practiced with undervalued exchange rate of the renminbi the author statistically shows that in the past 25 years the renminbi was stronger than the G7’s currencies and substantially stronger than the currencies of China’s neighbour competitors. It looks that devaluation-averse sentiments hinder China’s decision makers from introduction of real liberalisation of its financial account, because free transborder movements of capital may create sharp depreciating impact on the renminbi and thus undermine Chinese economic achievements of last decades. That’s why it is unlikely that the renminbi will substantially increase its international role in the foreseeable future.","PeriodicalId":398103,"journal":{"name":"World Economy and International Relations","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Economy and International Relations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-6-59-70","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Received 29.01.2021. The renminbi was included in the SDR basket from October 2016. In that time there were a lot of doubts about whether the renminbi was enough freely used currency to comply with the criteria of such inclusion. Other opinions focused on possibility that this inclusion would boost international usage of the renminbi. The author analyses statistics and comes to conclusion that the maximum boost of the renminbi usage was achieved right before the inclusion. The China’s statistics shows the boost of renminbi usage in the external transactions in 2016–2020, but statistics of its trading partners and SWIFT reveal only moderate growth or even stagnation in this period. One of explanation of this discrepancy may be that despite Chinese banks’ substantially increased external lending in renminbi in recent years, it looks that banks actually do not transfer renminbi abroad to borrowers. Banks just remit these sums to Chinese suppliers under the instructions by foreign borrowers. Then those borrowers repay those renminbi loans most likely in dollars. So China’s statistics record boost of renminbi usage, but its trading partners do not see those renminbi. The key obstacle for widening international usage of renminbi is remaining restrictions (formal and informal) for transactions under the financial account of China’s balance of payments. The author considers prospects of increasing the international role of the renminbi and comes to conclusion that it is likely that China is afraid of liberalisation of its financial accounts because there is a risk of long-term depreciation of the renminbi. Contrary to widely popular belief that China stands for and practiced with undervalued exchange rate of the renminbi the author statistically shows that in the past 25 years the renminbi was stronger than the G7’s currencies and substantially stronger than the currencies of China’s neighbour competitors. It looks that devaluation-averse sentiments hinder China’s decision makers from introduction of real liberalisation of its financial account, because free transborder movements of capital may create sharp depreciating impact on the renminbi and thus undermine Chinese economic achievements of last decades. That’s why it is unlikely that the renminbi will substantially increase its international role in the foreseeable future.
人民币加入特别提款权五周年:成果与展望
收到29.01.2021。2016年10月,人民币被纳入特别提款权货币篮子。当时有很多人怀疑人民币是否足够自由使用,以符合纳入的标准。其他观点关注的是人民币纳入sdr是否会促进人民币在国际上的使用。通过对统计数据的分析,得出人民币使用量在纳入前达到最大增幅的结论。中国的统计数据显示,2016-2020年,人民币在对外交易中的使用有所增加,但其贸易伙伴和SWIFT的统计数据显示,这一时期人民币的增长幅度不大,甚至停滞不前。对这种差异的一种解释可能是,尽管近年来中国银行的人民币对外贷款大幅增加,但看起来银行实际上并没有将人民币转移到海外借款人手中。银行只是按照外国借款人的指示,把这些钱汇给中国供应商。然后,这些借款人很可能用美元偿还这些人民币贷款。因此,中国的统计数据记录了人民币使用量的增长,但其贸易伙伴并没有看到这些人民币。扩大人民币国际使用的关键障碍,是对中国国际收支金融账户交易的限制(正式和非正式)依然存在。作者考虑了提高人民币国际地位的前景,并得出结论认为,中国很可能害怕放开其金融账户,因为存在人民币长期贬值的风险。与普遍认为中国支持并实行低估人民币汇率的看法相反,作者的统计数据显示,在过去25年里,人民币比七国集团(G7)的货币强,也比中国的邻国竞争对手的货币强得多。看起来,厌恶贬值的情绪阻碍了中国决策者对其金融账户实行真正的自由化,因为资本的自由跨境流动可能会对人民币造成急剧贬值的影响,从而破坏中国过去几十年取得的经济成就。这就是为什么在可预见的未来,人民币不太可能大幅提升其国际地位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信