An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law

Robert H. Sitkoff
{"title":"An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law","authors":"Robert H. Sitkoff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.412592","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts, focusing chiefly on donative trusts. The agency costs approach offers fresh insights into recurring problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called trust protectors, and spendthrift trusts. The normative claim is that the law should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor. Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor's original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem that arises when risk-bearing and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants). The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative approach. This Article draws on the economics of the principal-agent problem and the theory of the firm, and it engages the ongoing debate about whether trust law is closer to property law or contract law. Although the analysis focuses on donative trusts, it should be amenable to extension in future work to commercial and charitable trusts.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"46","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412592","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46

Abstract

This Article develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts, focusing chiefly on donative trusts. The agency costs approach offers fresh insights into recurring problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called trust protectors, and spendthrift trusts. The normative claim is that the law should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor. Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor's original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem that arises when risk-bearing and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants). The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative approach. This Article draws on the economics of the principal-agent problem and the theory of the firm, and it engages the ongoing debate about whether trust law is closer to property law or contract law. Although the analysis focuses on donative trusts, it should be amenable to extension in future work to commercial and charitable trusts.
信托法的代理成本理论
本文发展了私人信托法的代理成本理论,主要研究捐赠信托。代理成本方法提供了对信托法中反复出现的问题的新见解,这些问题包括变更和终止、受托人地位、信托诉讼、信托投资法和公正义务、受托人撤职、所谓的信托保护者的角色以及挥霍无度的信托。规范性的主张是,法律应尽量减少将管理权交给受托人并将剩余索取权交给受益人所固有的代理成本,但只有在这样做符合财产分配人事先指示的情况下。因此,私人信托的使用引发了一个暂时代理问题(受托人是否会继续忠于受托人最初的愿望),以及风险承担和管理分离时通常出现的代理问题(受托人/管理人是否会按照受益人/剩余索赔人的最大利益行事)。积极的主张是,至少就传统学说而言,法律符合建议的规范性方法。本文借鉴了委托代理问题和公司理论的经济学,并参与了关于信托法更接近物权法还是合同法的持续争论。虽然分析的重点是捐赠信托,但在未来的工作中,它应该适合扩展到商业信托和慈善信托。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信