Vincent Werner, Laurent Maingault, Marie-Laure Potet
{"title":"An End-to-End Approach for Multi-Fault Attack Vulnerability Assessment","authors":"Vincent Werner, Laurent Maingault, Marie-Laure Potet","doi":"10.1109/FDTC51366.2020.00009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although multi-fault attacks are extremely powerful in defeating sophisticated hardware and software defences, detecting and exploiting such attacks remains a difficult problem, especially without any prior knowledge of the target. Our main contribution is an end-to-end approach for multi-fault attack vulnerability assessment We take advantage of target specific fault models rather than generic fault models to achieve complex multi-fault attacks that can lead to critical vulnerabilities. Target specific fault models are generated thanks to fault models inference process, based on a fault injections simulation and a characterization, in order to elaborate powerful multi-fault attacks based on different fault models. Combining fault models opens up new possible attack paths and adds flexibility to design fault attacks that adapt to countermeasures. Hence, the direct consequence of the increasing complexity of fault attacks question the effectiveness of software countermeasures based on generic fault models for sensitive applications.","PeriodicalId":168420,"journal":{"name":"2020 Workshop on Fault Detection and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"269 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 Workshop on Fault Detection and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC51366.2020.00009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Although multi-fault attacks are extremely powerful in defeating sophisticated hardware and software defences, detecting and exploiting such attacks remains a difficult problem, especially without any prior knowledge of the target. Our main contribution is an end-to-end approach for multi-fault attack vulnerability assessment We take advantage of target specific fault models rather than generic fault models to achieve complex multi-fault attacks that can lead to critical vulnerabilities. Target specific fault models are generated thanks to fault models inference process, based on a fault injections simulation and a characterization, in order to elaborate powerful multi-fault attacks based on different fault models. Combining fault models opens up new possible attack paths and adds flexibility to design fault attacks that adapt to countermeasures. Hence, the direct consequence of the increasing complexity of fault attacks question the effectiveness of software countermeasures based on generic fault models for sensitive applications.