Hacking Satellites With Software Defined Radio

Kimberly Lukin, Maximilian Haselberger
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The race to put satellites into space has attracted new commercial players and amateur satellite operators. Even though these satellites rise level of new innovations and services for consumers, lack of regulations and standards consequently brings solutions which are not so well protected. Disrupting or hacking satellite connections can have a significant effect on society or business. Previously, satellite hacking has been considered only in the context of state organized activity, however our research proofs that cheap software defined radios offers possibility to listen and attack these connections without thorough domain knowledge. Companies and governments, who operate satellites or communication links, want to ensure that confidentiality, integrity and availability are guaranteed also under exceptional conditions. However currently there is not situational awareness provided for cyber related incidents for many civil operated satellites. Therefore, this research builds awareness of attack methodology against satellite connections to build robust, security tested satellite communication solutions that are protected against the attacks and that should be able to operate in constantly evolving cyber threat matrix.
用软件无线电攻击卫星
将卫星送入太空的竞赛吸引了新的商业参与者和业余卫星运营商。尽管这些卫星为消费者提供了新的创新和服务水平,但由于缺乏法规和标准,因此带来的解决方案得不到很好的保护。破坏或入侵卫星连接可能对社会或商业产生重大影响。以前,卫星黑客只被认为是在国家组织活动的背景下进行的,然而我们的研究证明,廉价的软件无线电提供了在没有透彻的领域知识的情况下监听和攻击这些连接的可能性。运营卫星或通信链路的公司和政府希望确保机密性、完整性和可用性在特殊情况下也能得到保证。然而,目前许多民用卫星还没有为网络相关事件提供态势感知。因此,本研究建立了对卫星连接攻击方法的认识,以构建强大的、经过安全测试的卫星通信解决方案,这些解决方案可以抵御攻击,并且应该能够在不断发展的网络威胁矩阵中运行。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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