{"title":"Hacking Satellites With Software Defined Radio","authors":"Kimberly Lukin, Maximilian Haselberger","doi":"10.1109/DASC50938.2020.9256695","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The race to put satellites into space has attracted new commercial players and amateur satellite operators. Even though these satellites rise level of new innovations and services for consumers, lack of regulations and standards consequently brings solutions which are not so well protected. Disrupting or hacking satellite connections can have a significant effect on society or business. Previously, satellite hacking has been considered only in the context of state organized activity, however our research proofs that cheap software defined radios offers possibility to listen and attack these connections without thorough domain knowledge. Companies and governments, who operate satellites or communication links, want to ensure that confidentiality, integrity and availability are guaranteed also under exceptional conditions. However currently there is not situational awareness provided for cyber related incidents for many civil operated satellites. Therefore, this research builds awareness of attack methodology against satellite connections to build robust, security tested satellite communication solutions that are protected against the attacks and that should be able to operate in constantly evolving cyber threat matrix.","PeriodicalId":112045,"journal":{"name":"2020 AIAA/IEEE 39th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 AIAA/IEEE 39th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC50938.2020.9256695","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
The race to put satellites into space has attracted new commercial players and amateur satellite operators. Even though these satellites rise level of new innovations and services for consumers, lack of regulations and standards consequently brings solutions which are not so well protected. Disrupting or hacking satellite connections can have a significant effect on society or business. Previously, satellite hacking has been considered only in the context of state organized activity, however our research proofs that cheap software defined radios offers possibility to listen and attack these connections without thorough domain knowledge. Companies and governments, who operate satellites or communication links, want to ensure that confidentiality, integrity and availability are guaranteed also under exceptional conditions. However currently there is not situational awareness provided for cyber related incidents for many civil operated satellites. Therefore, this research builds awareness of attack methodology against satellite connections to build robust, security tested satellite communication solutions that are protected against the attacks and that should be able to operate in constantly evolving cyber threat matrix.