{"title":"Whither Command of the Commons? Choosing Security over Control","authors":"Sameer P. Lalwani, Joshua R. Shifrinson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2256101","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The United States’ ability to command the global commons – the sea, air, and space domains through which goods, people, and information flow – has been a pillar of United States national security for the last thirty years. The United States has ensured its command by pursuing what we term control of the commons: preventing the emergence of plausible threats to U.S. military dominance by state and non-state actors alike, well ahead of their actual manifestation. At a time when budgets are being cut and new great powers exert increasing influence in international affairs, control of the commons is increasingly unsustainable.In its stead, this paper advocates for a new approach to retaining command of the commons, what we term “security of the commons.” Focusing on the maritime domain, we first argue that the global maritime commons is far more resilient than many recognize: potential threats to the commons are overstated as other actors lack sufficient means or incentives to severely disrupt U.S. command. As a result, there is significant room for the United States to reduce its military footprint while retaining command. Thus, the security-based approach we advocate calls for the United States to reduce its military presence around the world as part of a move towards an over-the-horizon strategic presence. This change would reduce the problem of free-riding and the risk of spirals of insecurity with other powerful actors while leaving the United States a significant capacity – on its own and in partnership with other nations – to defeat threats to the commons if and when they manifest. This approach will also allow the United States to reinvest in the sources of American power that will sustain its position in the global order.","PeriodicalId":289975,"journal":{"name":"MIT Political Science Department Research Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MIT Political Science Department Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2256101","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
The United States’ ability to command the global commons – the sea, air, and space domains through which goods, people, and information flow – has been a pillar of United States national security for the last thirty years. The United States has ensured its command by pursuing what we term control of the commons: preventing the emergence of plausible threats to U.S. military dominance by state and non-state actors alike, well ahead of their actual manifestation. At a time when budgets are being cut and new great powers exert increasing influence in international affairs, control of the commons is increasingly unsustainable.In its stead, this paper advocates for a new approach to retaining command of the commons, what we term “security of the commons.” Focusing on the maritime domain, we first argue that the global maritime commons is far more resilient than many recognize: potential threats to the commons are overstated as other actors lack sufficient means or incentives to severely disrupt U.S. command. As a result, there is significant room for the United States to reduce its military footprint while retaining command. Thus, the security-based approach we advocate calls for the United States to reduce its military presence around the world as part of a move towards an over-the-horizon strategic presence. This change would reduce the problem of free-riding and the risk of spirals of insecurity with other powerful actors while leaving the United States a significant capacity – on its own and in partnership with other nations – to defeat threats to the commons if and when they manifest. This approach will also allow the United States to reinvest in the sources of American power that will sustain its position in the global order.