Matching with Floor Constraints

ERN: Search Pub Date : 2020-10-16 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3713005
Sumeyra Akin
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy‐proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.
与楼层约束匹配
下限约束是许多匹配市场的突出特征,例如医疗住院医师、教师分配和军事学员匹配。我们发展了底部约束下的匹配市场理论。我们引入了一个稳定性的概念,我们称之为尊重底线的稳定性,对于必须尊重(硬)底线约束的市场。如果没有医生和医院联盟可以提出可行的替代匹配并对其成员进行改进,那么匹配就是稳定的底线。我们的稳定性概念强加了额外的条件,即联盟不能将联盟外的医生重新分配到另一家医院(尽管她可以被解雇)。这个条件是保证稳定匹配存在的必要条件。我们为医生提供了一种策略证明的机制,并实现了一个尊重稳定匹配的地板。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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