Lock Down on the Third Screen: How Wireless Carriers Evade Regulation of Their Video Services

R. Frieden
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Wireless handsets increasingly offer subscribers a third screen for accessing the Internet and video programming. The converging technologies and markets that make this possible present a major regulatory quandary, because national regulatory authorities seek to maintain mutual exclusivity between regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information services. Many existing and emerging services do not easily fit into one or the other regulatory classification, nor can the Federal Communications Commission determine the appropriate classification by extrapolating from the regulatory model applied to existing or discontinued services. By failing to specify what model applies to services appearing on cellphone screens, the FCC has failed to remove regulatory uncertainty. Cellular telephone service providers may infer from the Commission's inaction that any convergent service eventually will qualify for the unregulated information service "safe harbor" despite plausible arguments that government oversight remains essential to achieve consumer protection, national security, fair trade practice, and other safeguards. This essay will examine the regulatory status of wireless carrier-delivered video content with an eye toward determining the necessary scope and nature of government oversight. The essay reports on instances where the FCC deemed it necessary to promote video programming competition and subscriber access to wired cable television content, and concludes that wireless subscribers deserve similar efforts in light of wireless carriers' incentives and abilities to blunt competition. The essay concludes that NRAs must balance the carriers' interests in finding new revenue centers to pay for next generation network upgrades with subscribers' interests in maximizing their freedom to use handsets they own.
锁定第三屏:无线运营商如何逃避对其视频服务的监管
无线手机越来越多地为用户提供第三个屏幕来访问互联网和视频节目。使这种情况成为可能的趋同技术和市场造成了一个重大的管理难题,因为国家管理当局力图在受管制的电信服务和基本上不受管制的信息服务之间保持相互排他性。许多现有的和新兴的服务不容易归入一种或另一种监管分类,联邦通信委员会也不能通过从适用于现有或已终止服务的监管模型中推断出适当的分类。由于未能明确规定哪种模式适用于出现在手机屏幕上的服务,FCC未能消除监管上的不确定性。移动电话服务提供商可能会从委员会的不作为中推断,任何融合服务最终都有资格获得不受监管的信息服务“安全港”,尽管似乎有理由认为,政府监督对于实现消费者保护、国家安全、公平贸易实践和其他保障措施仍然至关重要。本文将考察无线运营商提供的视频内容的监管状况,着眼于确定政府监管的必要范围和性质。这篇文章报告了FCC认为有必要促进视频节目竞争和有线有线电视内容的用户接入的实例,并得出结论,鉴于无线运营商的动机和削弱竞争的能力,无线用户应该得到类似的努力。这篇文章的结论是,nra必须平衡运营商寻找新收入中心来支付下一代网络升级的利益,以及用户最大限度地自由使用自己手机的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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