Defense of Military Installations from Ballistic Missile Attack Doctrine, History, Challenges, and Future Research

Abstract

While NATO nations have long enjoyed relative security from air attack at military installations, recent developments in missile technology and doctrine have threatened that security. With 26 conflicts worldwide in the past 100 years featuring airbase attacks, doctrine and planning tools must be updated to allow continued use of air bases within missile range of enemy forces. Research conducted for the United States Air Force identifies the areas of base resilience and how they affect mission capability. Several models have been developed based on these principles, but there are gaps in model capability and usefulness for allied partners. This paper presents the proposal of a novel base planning model capable of directly quantifying missile attack consequences and generating optimal site layout plans and protection strategies. This model would be implemented using multi-objective genetic algorithms to identify solutions that provide optimal tradeoffs between the competing objectives of minimizing attack consequences, minimizing site construction costs, and minimizing mission impact. These capabilities are expected to assist military engineers in their critical task of analyzing and selecting the design strategy that minimizes operational impacts to a base located in a contested region.