Director Networks and Informed Traders

Ferhat Akbas, Felix Meschke, M. B. Wintoki
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引用次数: 77

Abstract

We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.
主管网络和知情交易员
我们提供的证据表明,老练的投资者,如卖空者、期权交易者和金融机构,在交易董事会成员关系更密切的公司的股票时,信息更灵通。对于拥有大型董事网络的公司来说,知情交易的最高和最低五分之一之间的年化回报差异在4%到7.2%之间,而与此相比,拥有较少联系董事的公司的回报差异相同。经验丰富的投资者能更好地预测即将到来的盈利意外结果,以及董事关系更密切的公司特有的新闻情绪。董事会连通性的变化与逆向选择措施的变化呈正相关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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