Dithering Between Consultation and Consensus – Whereto with Advisory Bodies for Indigenous Peoples?

B. de Villiers
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Abstract

The establishment of permanent, national consultative bodies for Indigenous Peoples is rare, but insight can be gained from comparative experiences such as the Sámi Parliament of Finland, previous advisory bodies for Aboriginal People in Australia, and more recently progress by the Khoisan in South Africa. Advisory bodies for Indigenous Peoples at the national level are often the victim of competing expectations. Governments tend to approach advisory bodies as fora for consultation on terms that are, in essence, dictated by government with the outcome being little more than non-binding recommendations, whilst Indigenous Peoples seek a form of co-government arrangement whereby there is some legal or policy requirement for their advice to be actively sought and sincerely considered, even if such advice is not legally binding. Four questions are the subject of this article: (1) how should an advisory body be composed; (2) what should be the policy or functional areas on which consultation must take place; (3) what is meant by an obligation to consult or to negotiate; and (4) can laws or policies be judicially challenged if there was a failure to consult, or if there is a failure to give effect to the advice received from the advisory body? The conclusion is reached that the enforceability of good faith negotiation or consultation obligations is principally found in the conduct and goodwill of governments, rather than by way of judicial review and oversight. Courts are unlikely to evaluate the substance of negotiations whereby the merit or reasonableness of proposals and counter-proposals become a matter for judicial consideration. Courts have, however, shown a greater willingness to consider procedural aspects of consultation such as the actions, behaviour, and conduct of the parties during the course of consultation, but with acknowledgment that at law good faith consultation does not necessarily imply a veto; it does not legally mandate an agreement; and it does not preclude a party standing firm in its position. It is noted that even in those cases where courts have enforced consultation obligations, actual consultation is usually directed at local projects that involve access to traditional lands, and not to general consultative rights or duties at a national level about national socio-economic policies.
在协商与共识之间摇摆不定——土著人民咨询机构何去何从?
为土著人民设立常设的国家协商机构是罕见的,但是可以从诸如Sámi芬兰议会、澳大利亚以前的土著人民咨询机构以及最近南非科伊桑人取得的进展等比较经验中获得洞察力。国家一级的土著人民咨询机构往往是相互矛盾的期望的受害者。各国政府倾向于把咨询机构作为协商的论坛,协商的条件基本上是由政府规定的,结果只不过是没有约束力的建议,而土著人民则寻求一种共同政府安排的形式,在这种安排中,有一些法律或政策要求积极寻求和真诚考虑他们的意见,即使这种意见没有法律约束力。本文的主题是四个问题:(1)咨询机构应如何组成;(2)必须就哪些政策或功能范畴进行谘询;(三)协商或者谈判的义务是什么意思;及(四)若没有谘询,或没有落实谘询团体所提供的意见,法律或政策可否受到司法质疑?结论是,诚信谈判或协商义务的可执行性主要体现在政府的行为和善意中,而不是通过司法审查和监督。法院不太可能评价谈判的实质内容,因此提案和反提案的优点或合理性成为司法审议的事项。然而,法院表现出更大的意愿考虑协商的程序方面,例如各方在协商过程中的行动、行为和行为,但承认在法律上善意协商并不一定意味着否决;它在法律上并不强制要求达成协议;而且,这并不妨碍一个政党坚持自己的立场。人们注意到,即使在法院强制执行协商义务的情况下,实际的协商通常是针对涉及使用传统土地的地方项目,而不是针对国家一级关于国家社会经济政策的一般协商权利或义务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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