Labor Market Matching with Ensuing Competitive Externalities in Large Economies

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper presents a general model of an economy of two connected markets: a labor market, in which a continuum of managers are to be assigned to a continuum of firms, and a goods market, in which firms play perfect output competition. A Walrasian equilibrium always exists in the model. If firm technology and human capital are complementary, in equilibrium the positive assortative matching (PAM) is stable; if substutative, the nagative assortative matching (NAM) is stable. As the unit production cost of each firm-manager pair goes to be constant, the PAM will be the unique stable matching except on a null-set.
大型经济体中劳动力市场匹配与竞争外部性
本文提出了一个具有两个相连市场的经济的一般模型:一个是劳动力市场,其中连续的管理者被分配到连续的企业,另一个是商品市场,其中企业进行完全产出竞争。模型中始终存在瓦尔拉斯均衡。当企业技术与人力资本具有互补性时,正分类匹配在均衡状态下是稳定的;如果是替代的,则负分类匹配是稳定的。当每个企业-经理对的单位生产成本趋于恒定时,PAM将是除零集之外唯一的稳定匹配。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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