The New Dollars and Dreams: American Incomes and Economic Change

Ulf Zimmermann
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引用次数: 22

Abstract

The New Dollars and Dreams: American Incomes and Economic Change. Frank Levy. NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998. ISBN 0-87154-515-2. $16.95 paper. Levy's original Dollars and Dreams recounted the tremendous growth in incomes following World War II. The "new" version tells of the disturbingly little growth there has been since the early '70s. It tells, too, of the even more disturbing increase in income inequality: When the earlier growth peaked around 1969, the richest five percent of families claimed 15.6 percent of total income; by 1996 that share had shot up to 20.3 percent. So what happened? After the war it was possible for unskilled workers, including blacks from the South moving up north, to find well-paying jobs in heavy industry/manufacturing. (A considerable equalization of what had been vast regional discrepancies resulted as these migrants lowered average incomes in the North while raising them in the South by their departure.) But then that high-income North turned into the "rustbelt" as de-industrialization set in and such opportunities for the unskilled disappeared. The beginning of the end of this great growth came with the worldwide crop failures of 1972/1973 which led to a 34 percent increase in food prices. This was followed by the (contrived) oil shortage through which OPEC was able to triple prices. These inflations impacted family income considerably, to the point that it actually dropped (in 1997 dollars) from a postwar high of $40,400 in 1973 to $38,600 by 1975. (By 1989 it had risen merely to $43,600 and because inflation and productivity both stayed low it went down to $43,200 in 1996.) Incomes remained fairly flat for several reasons. There was a productivity decline in which three factors played a role: higher oil prices changed techniques used to achieve productivity; maturing baby boomers, and more women, entering the workforce in greater numbers lowered the average workforce experience and hence wages; and increased government regulation diverted research from streamlining production to reducing pollution and protecting workers. And there was a lack of technological change that contributed substantially as well. Pressure to improve productivity, and technology, didn't come until the early '80s, and by the mid-'80s it extended to the service sector, with first blue- (low-skilled) and then white-collar workers getting laid off. The beginning computerization of work played a familiar role in these years. It's true that there has been a substantial expansion of the service sector in the U.S. economy, but Levy makes it clear that this is not as radical as many believe and certainly is not the explanation for the sorry state of family incomes. As he reminds us, even in 1947 the service sector consumed 53 percent of hours of employment; by 1996 it was 77 percent. Productivity grows very slowly in services-you can only speed up a haircut so much, likewise brain surgery. What's really more the issue is that services involve jobs both for the well-educated and for the unskilled. This most salient skills differential really shows up after 1979 when the gap between high school- and college-educated white males shot up from nine to 32 percent. …
新的美元和梦想:美国人的收入和经济变化
新的美元和梦想:美国人的收入和经济变化。弗兰克征税。纽约:拉塞尔·塞奇基金会,1998年。ISBN 0-87154-515-2。16.95美元。列维最初的《美元与梦想》讲述了二战后收入的巨大增长。“新”版本讲述了自上世纪70年代初以来令人不安的微弱增长。它还表明,收入不平等的加剧更令人不安:当早期的增长在1969年左右达到顶峰时,最富有的5%的家庭占总收入的15.6%;到1996年,这一比例飙升至20.3%。那么发生了什么?战争结束后,非技术工人,包括从南方搬到北方的黑人,有可能在重工业/制造业找到高薪工作。(由于这些移民的离开,北方的平均收入降低了,而南方的平均收入却提高了,这在很大程度上抵消了地区间的巨大差异。)但随后,随着去工业化的开始,高收入的北方变成了“锈带”,非技术工人的这种机会消失了。随着1972/1973年世界范围内的作物歉收,粮食价格上涨了34%,这一快速增长的终结开始了。随之而来的是(人为的)石油短缺,石油输出国组织得以将价格提高三倍。这些通货膨胀对家庭收入的影响相当大,以至于家庭收入实际上(以1997年的美元计算)从1973年战后最高的40400美元下降到1975年的38600美元。(到1989年,这一数字仅上升到43,600美元,由于通货膨胀和生产率都很低,1996年下降到43,200美元。)由于几个原因,收入保持相当平稳。造成生产率下降的原因有三个:高油价改变了提高生产率的技术;成熟的婴儿潮一代和更多的女性大量进入劳动力市场,降低了平均工作经验,从而降低了工资;政府监管的增加将研究从简化生产转移到减少污染和保护工人上。而且缺乏技术变革,这也起到了很大的作用。提高生产力和技术的压力直到80年代初才出现,到80年代中期,这种压力扩展到服务业,先是低技能工人,然后是白领工人被解雇。这些年来,工作的计算机化开始发挥了人们熟悉的作用。的确,美国经济中的服务业出现了大幅扩张,但利维明确表示,这并不像许多人认为的那样激进,当然也不是家庭收入糟糕状况的解释。正如他提醒我们的那样,即使在1947年,服务业也消耗了53%的就业时间;到1996年,这一比例为77%。服务业的生产率增长非常缓慢——理发的速度只能加快这么多,脑外科手术也是如此。更重要的是,服务业既为受过良好教育的人提供工作,也为没有技能的人提供工作。这种最显著的技能差异在1979年之后真正显现出来,当时受过高中和大学教育的白人男性之间的差距从9%飙升至32%。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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