Hyperopic Loss Aversion

Jan S. Krause, P. Ring, Ulrich Schmidt
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The literature reports a tendency that future losses are discounted less than future gains, the so-called sign effect in intertemporal decision making. In this article, we study implications of the sign effect on risk taking: If future losses are discounted less than future gains, mixed lotteries involving both gains and losses should become less attractive when payments are delayed into the future. We refer to this phenomenon as Hyperopic Loss Aversion and provide experimental evidence for it: First, we provide a robust conceptual replication of the sign effect where we find non-positive discount rates for losses. Second, we confirm our hypothesis that mixed lotteries become less attractive over time. This effect can be attributed to Hyperopic Loss Aversion in our design, as a delay does not change the valuation of either pure gain and pure loss lotteries. Finally, we apply the notion of Hyperopic Loss Aversion to investment decisions and show that it offers a novel behavioral explanation for the equity premium puzzle. While our empirical analyses are entirely model-free, we also introduce a theoretical basis to analyze Hyperopic Loss Aversion. Our model, termed Discounted Prospect Theory, can be regarded as a natural extension of Prospect Theory to the intertemporal domain.
远视损失厌恶
文献报告了一种趋势,即未来的损失比未来的收益贴现得少,即所谓的跨期决策中的符号效应。在本文中,我们研究了符号效应对风险承担的影响:如果未来损失的贴现小于未来收益,那么当支付延迟到未来时,涉及收益和损失的混合彩票应该变得不那么吸引人。我们将这种现象称为远视损失厌恶,并为此提供实验证据:首先,我们提供了符号效应的稳健概念复制,其中我们发现损失的非正贴现率。其次,我们证实了我们的假设,即混合彩票随着时间的推移变得不那么有吸引力。这种效应可以归因于我们设计中的超视损失厌恶,因为延迟不会改变纯收益和纯损失彩票的估值。最后,我们将超视损失厌恶的概念应用于投资决策,并表明它为股票溢价之谜提供了一种新的行为解释。虽然我们的实证分析完全没有模型,但我们也引入了分析远视损失厌恶的理论基础。我们的模型,称为贴现前景理论,可以被视为前景理论的自然延伸到跨期领域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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