Taxing Parents: Welfarist Theories

S. McCormack
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Abstract

The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) taxes parents inequitably. Couples with a sole earner are under-taxed compared to couples with dual earners or single parents. Previous scholarship has identified these inequities and then argued that this sole earner bias should be eliminated. These arguments, however, have often been incomplete. Simply establishing that an inequity exists does not create a full argument for legal reform. After all, the Code plays favorites all the time. Scholars have traditionally turned to theories of distributive justice when evaluating whether tax preferences are warranted. These theories offer competing visions about the way resources should be allocated. Rather than advocating blanket equality, these theories identify higher order principles that justify preferential-ism. But scholars who have asked Congress to eliminate the Code’s preference for sole earners have often failed to connect their arguments with this distributive literature. This Article, the first in a series, begins to connect traditional theories of distributive justice with the debate surrounding the Code’s inequitable taxation of parents. To do so, it focuses on welfarist theories — a body of distributive theories that seek to maximize social welfare — because of the dominant influence they have exerted over tax debates. It reaches the surprising conclusion that welfarism may, in many cases, support the Code’s sole earner bias. But the reasons for this prescription are revealing — sole earners have fewer costs and time constraints than single parents and dual earners and may, therefore, be better positioned to use their income to achieve well-being. Many will find it counter-intuitive to favor sole earners just because they have more choices than other parents. For them, the analysis may reveal the limitations of relying too heavily on welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents. This Article concludes with a call for sustained consideration of other non-welfarist theories that have been largely overlooked in the legal tax scholarship.
向父母征税:福利主义理论
《国内税收法》(简称《税法》)对父母的征税不公平。与双职工家庭或单亲家庭相比,单亲家庭的税负较低。以前的学者已经发现了这些不平等,然后认为这种唯一的挣钱偏见应该被消除。然而,这些论点往往是不完整的。简单地确定不平等的存在并不能为法律改革提供充分的论据。毕竟,法典总是偏心的。在评估税收优惠是否合理时,学者们传统上转向分配正义理论。这些理论对资源分配方式提出了相互矛盾的看法。这些理论不是提倡全面的平等,而是确定了更高层次的原则,为优惠主义辩护。但是,那些要求国会取消《税法》对唯一收入者的优待的学者们,往往未能将他们的论点与这种分配文献联系起来。本文是系列文章中的第一篇,开始将分配正义的传统理论与围绕《法典》对父母不公平征税的辩论联系起来。为了做到这一点,它把重点放在福利主义理论上——一组寻求社会福利最大化的分配理论——因为它们在税收辩论中发挥了主导作用。它得出了一个令人惊讶的结论:在许多情况下,福利主义可能支持《准则》唯一的收入偏见。但开出这一处方的原因是显而易见的——与单亲父母和双职工相比,单身人士的成本和时间限制更少,因此,他们可能更有能力利用自己的收入来实现幸福。许多人会发现,仅仅因为单身父母比其他父母有更多的选择,就偏袒他们是违反直觉的。对他们来说,这种分析可能揭示了过于依赖福利主义来分析父母税收的局限性。本文最后呼吁持续考虑其他非福利主义理论,这些理论在法律税收学术中很大程度上被忽视了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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