BRIEF SCRUTINY OF THE HEGELIAN ONTO-LOGIC: THE UNBEGUN IDENTITY OF BEING AND NOTHING AS UNSAYABLE PASSING OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE IN BECOMING

H. M. Trif-Boia
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Abstract

In the process of Logic’s and Metaphysics’ education, the fundamental principle that has to be grasped as an implacable prerequisite, is the principle of identity. The principle has two fundamental instantiations: the formal one and the non-formal one. The choice for one or the other has implications regarding the very propaedeutic of the educable since he cannot devise any ultimate meaning of this principle, especially in Metaphysics, if the educable does not begin to thematize the very transformation of his/her own thought by the mutations that the rethinking of this principle supposes. Therefore, Hegel is our choice in this matter since he is the thinker who, by definition has conceived this matter as a question of subject and object coincidence, thus, any change that the object incurs, is already inscribed in the inner economy of the subject’s thought too. As a consequence, our discussion will take into consideration only the speculative variant of the non-formal actualizations of the identity principle, and we shall not discuss G. Priest’s dialetheism that we reject. Hegelian methodology is, thusly, substantiated by the very endeavor of thinking the issue of the concepts that are taken into consideration — there is no difference, for Hegel, between the method of arriving at the object of research and the object; the method is the object, and the object is the method because they are the very paths that reveal the inner power of reflection and the substance of the conceiving subject: in Metaphysics the subject conceives himself, and this activity is the very object and the very method that are scrutinized. The coincidence between subject, object and method are to be discussed from a propaedeutic point of view in another paper. In the present paper we shall only discuss the principle of identity which is here to be taken into consideration in its first fundamental occurrence, that of metaphysical Ontology as it is engaged by Hegel in the Science of Logic. We shall hereby discuss the problem of the originary thinking by Hegel of Being, Nothing and Becoming. In the economy of Hegelian thought these instantiations and their speculative dialectics are engaged by the implicit supposition of a non-formal principle of identity. Though the proper instantiation of the principle of identity is discussed by Hegel in his second part of the Science of Logic (the chapter of Essence), this occurrence is decisively settled with the beginning of the first chapter of the Science of Logic (Being) where Hegel initiates the beginning of philosophy as beginning of thinking; and the beginning of thinking is discussed as absolute ontological beginning. Therefore, in a swift analysis we are hereby clearing a few aspects concerning the Hegelian ontology and its suppositions towards the identity principle. Is Being correctly assumed as purely abstract and void of determinations? Is Being coincidentally postulated as identical with Nothing? Is there a superior unity between Being and Nothing? Is Being’s and Nothing’s difference an ontological irreducible difference? What is Becoming? The conclusions to these questions should be illuminating not only for the philosopher, but for every human being that has the conscience of his/her own existential issues under the pressure of the unknown.
对黑格尔本体论逻辑的简要考察:存在与无物的未开始的同一性是同一性和差异的不可言说的传递
在逻辑学和形而上学的教育过程中,必须把握的基本原则是同一性原则,这是一个不可动摇的前提。该原则有两个基本实例:形式实例和非形式实例。选择其一或另一种,对于受教育者来说是有意义的,因为他不能设计出这一原则的任何最终意义,特别是在形而上学中,如果受教育者没有开始将他/她自己的思想的转变主题化,通过重新思考这一原则所假设的突变。因此,在这个问题上,黑格尔是我们的选择,因为他是一个思想家,根据定义,他把这个问题看作是主客体重合的问题,因此,客体引起的任何变化,也已经被铭刻在主体思想的内在经济中。因此,我们的讨论将只考虑同一性原则的非形式实现的思辨变体,而不讨论我们所拒绝的普里斯特的双重神论。因此,黑格尔的方法论是由思考所考虑的概念问题的努力所证实的——在黑格尔看来,达到研究对象的方法和对象本身并没有区别;方法即是客体,客体即是方法,因为它们正是揭示反思的内在力量和构思主体的实质的途径。在形而上学中,主体构思自己,而这种活动正是被考察的客体和方法。在另一篇文章中,我们将从科学的角度来讨论主体、客体和方法之间的一致性。在本文中,我们只讨论同一性原则,这里只讨论同一性原则的第一个基本现象,即黑格尔在《逻辑学》中所采用的形而上学本体论的同一性原则。我们在此讨论黑格尔关于有、无、变的原始思维问题。在黑格尔的思想体系中,这些例证和它们的思辨辩证法是由一种非形式的同一性原则的隐含假设所参与的。虽然黑格尔在《逻辑科学》的第二部分(《本质》一章)中讨论了同一性原则的适当实例化,但在《逻辑科学(存在)》第一章的开头,黑格尔把哲学的开端作为思维的开端,就已经决定性地解决了这个问题。并将思维的开始作为绝对本体论的开始来讨论。因此,我们在此简要地分析一下黑格尔本体论及其对同一性原则的假设。存在是否被正确地假定为纯粹抽象的和没有规定的呢?有恰好被假定为与无相同吗?有与无之间是否有一种更高的统一?有与无的差别是本体论上不可约的差别吗?什么在变?这些问题的结论不仅对哲学家有启发性,而且对每一个在未知的压力下对自己的存在问题有良知的人都有启发性。
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