ZAPADNI SAVEZNICI I PARTIZANSKI POKRET U SRBIJI 1941‒1944: GLAVNI TOKOVI ODNOSA

N. Dević
{"title":"ZAPADNI SAVEZNICI I PARTIZANSKI POKRET U SRBIJI 1941‒1944: GLAVNI TOKOVI ODNOSA","authors":"N. Dević","doi":"10.46793/lz-lxii.257d","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The partisan movement passed from 1941‒1944. the long path of relations with the Western Allies: from the perception of Great Britain and the USA as capitalists and imperialists - ideological enemies (1941), through forced contacts (1942), rapprochement and an apparent turn towards the West (1943), to renewed and full cooperation with the SSSR and the Red Army at the expense of the West (summer and autumn 1944). On the other hand, the USA and Great Britain, through their missions and representatives on the ground, saw the partisans at the beginning of the war as an extended arm of Moscow, then as cooperative guerrillas towards whom a “smart policy” should be conducted, until full recognition and military assistance in the unraveling of civil war in Serbia. During all that time, however, Josip Broz Tito and the leadership of the communist movement maintained a kind of mimicry, which can be seen from their correspondence with the Comintern: even at the time of the greatest rapprochement with the West, their prejudices about those countries as an ideological enemy remained alive. As time went on, and the Red Army was closer to Serbia, these differences became more noticeable and the partisans turned more and more clearly towards their original ideological ally. The victory of the partisans in the civil war was conditioned by the help of both the East and the West, in the military, political and propaganda fields. In this sense, new research shows that the theses presented earlier about the authentic revolution of the Yugoslav partisans are scientifically unsustainable.","PeriodicalId":321485,"journal":{"name":"Leskovački zbornik","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Leskovački zbornik","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46793/lz-lxii.257d","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The partisan movement passed from 1941‒1944. the long path of relations with the Western Allies: from the perception of Great Britain and the USA as capitalists and imperialists - ideological enemies (1941), through forced contacts (1942), rapprochement and an apparent turn towards the West (1943), to renewed and full cooperation with the SSSR and the Red Army at the expense of the West (summer and autumn 1944). On the other hand, the USA and Great Britain, through their missions and representatives on the ground, saw the partisans at the beginning of the war as an extended arm of Moscow, then as cooperative guerrillas towards whom a “smart policy” should be conducted, until full recognition and military assistance in the unraveling of civil war in Serbia. During all that time, however, Josip Broz Tito and the leadership of the communist movement maintained a kind of mimicry, which can be seen from their correspondence with the Comintern: even at the time of the greatest rapprochement with the West, their prejudices about those countries as an ideological enemy remained alive. As time went on, and the Red Army was closer to Serbia, these differences became more noticeable and the partisans turned more and more clearly towards their original ideological ally. The victory of the partisans in the civil war was conditioned by the help of both the East and the West, in the military, political and propaganda fields. In this sense, new research shows that the theses presented earlier about the authentic revolution of the Yugoslav partisans are scientifically unsustainable.
游击运动从1941年持续到1944年。与西方盟国关系的漫长道路:从把英国和美国视为资本主义和帝国主义——意识形态上的敌人(1941年),到通过强制接触(1942年)、和解和明显转向西方(1943年),再到以牺牲西方为代价与苏联社会主义共和国共和国和苏联红军重新展开全面合作(1944年夏秋)。另一方面,美国和英国通过他们在当地的使团和代表,在战争开始时将游击队视为莫斯科的延伸,然后将其视为合作的游击队,应该对其采取“明智的政策”,直到在塞尔维亚内战的瓦解中得到充分承认和军事援助。然而,在这段时间里,铁托和共产主义运动的领导层保持着一种模仿,这可以从他们与共产国际的通信中看出:即使在与西方最友好的时期,他们把这些国家视为意识形态上的敌人的偏见仍然存在。随着时间的推移,红军离塞尔维亚越来越近,这些差异变得越来越明显,游击队员们越来越明显地转向他们最初的意识形态盟友。游击队在内战中的胜利是由东方和西方在军事、政治和宣传领域的帮助所决定的。在这个意义上,新的研究表明,先前提出的关于南斯拉夫游击队真正革命的论点在科学上是不可持续的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信