{"title":"Scientific Knowledge Fraud","authors":"Wes Henricksen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3188335","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The tobacco, asbestos, and fossil fuel industries, among others, have misled the public about the dangers posed by their products by lying about the science behind the products. Individuals harmed by these misrepresentations should be able to sue for fraud. Plaintiffs in fraud cases of this kind—where the misrepresentation pertains to scientific knowledge—face far greater obstacles to proving falsity, a required fraud element, than do typical fraud plaintiffs. Accordingly, a different falsity standard should apply in such cases. This Article answers three questions about how that standard should be crafted and applied. First, how should a court determine if a case before it is one to which this new standard should apply? Second, how should the court determine what knowledge the scientific community held at a given time for the purpose of assessing the truthfulness or falsity of a statement or omission? And third, how should courts compare that baseline truth with the defendant’s statement or omission to determine falsity? Answering these questions should help make it possible for those harmed by scientific knowledge fraud to obtain relief.","PeriodicalId":157380,"journal":{"name":"Environmental Anthropology eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Environmental Anthropology eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3188335","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The tobacco, asbestos, and fossil fuel industries, among others, have misled the public about the dangers posed by their products by lying about the science behind the products. Individuals harmed by these misrepresentations should be able to sue for fraud. Plaintiffs in fraud cases of this kind—where the misrepresentation pertains to scientific knowledge—face far greater obstacles to proving falsity, a required fraud element, than do typical fraud plaintiffs. Accordingly, a different falsity standard should apply in such cases. This Article answers three questions about how that standard should be crafted and applied. First, how should a court determine if a case before it is one to which this new standard should apply? Second, how should the court determine what knowledge the scientific community held at a given time for the purpose of assessing the truthfulness or falsity of a statement or omission? And third, how should courts compare that baseline truth with the defendant’s statement or omission to determine falsity? Answering these questions should help make it possible for those harmed by scientific knowledge fraud to obtain relief.