{"title":"Estrutura de controle e performance financeira: Uma análise de empresas\n brasileiras listadas e deslistadas, negociadas no Brasil e nos Estados\n Unidos","authors":"Alberto Granzotto, Igor Bernardi Sonza","doi":"10.12660/rbfin.v17n2.2019.77353","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The present work sought to identify the influence of the control\n structure on the accounting and market performance of listed and delisted\n Brazilian companies traded only on B3 as compared to those with a double\n listing with the US (ADRs). For this purpose, linear regressions were\n applied by GMM-Sys with unbalanced panel data. It was evidenced that for\n companies traded only on B3, the control structure is negatively related to\n efficiency while listed and positively related when delisting occurs,\n prevailing shareholder conflict. This context is inverse to that found in\n the analysis of ADRs, where the control structure is positively related to\n efficiency while listed and negatively related when delisting occur, proving\n that, in this case, agency conflicts prevail. This study confirms that the\n effects of US Commom Law also affect Brazilian companies that are traded in\n the US.","PeriodicalId":152637,"journal":{"name":"Brazilian Review of Finance","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Brazilian Review of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v17n2.2019.77353","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
The present work sought to identify the influence of the control
structure on the accounting and market performance of listed and delisted
Brazilian companies traded only on B3 as compared to those with a double
listing with the US (ADRs). For this purpose, linear regressions were
applied by GMM-Sys with unbalanced panel data. It was evidenced that for
companies traded only on B3, the control structure is negatively related to
efficiency while listed and positively related when delisting occurs,
prevailing shareholder conflict. This context is inverse to that found in
the analysis of ADRs, where the control structure is positively related to
efficiency while listed and negatively related when delisting occur, proving
that, in this case, agency conflicts prevail. This study confirms that the
effects of US Commom Law also affect Brazilian companies that are traded in
the US.