Elite Cues and Citizen Disagreement with Expert Opinion

David Darmofal
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引用次数: 98

Abstract

Though scholars have long been concerned about the quality of citizens’ political decision making, we still know little about why citizens disagree with the best-informed opinion in society, that of public policy experts. In this article, I examine the factors that lead citizens to disagree with expert opinion on questions of public policy. I find that both elite cues and individual-level attributes of citizens lead individuals to disagree with experts. In contrast to the expectations of many recent studies of cue taking, I find that citizens are more likely to disagree with expert opinion when political elites they favor challenge this opinion. Citizens also disagree with experts as a consequence of low levels of knowledge, existing policy preferences, and life experiences. The study’s results challenge the optimistic conclusions of many recent studies of cue taking and argue that there is significant value in the conventional wisdom that preceded these studies. Elite cues are not a consistent means to effective policy judgments. Instead, when it comes to reaching effective policy decisions, there is no substitute for knowledge.
精英线索和公民与专家意见的分歧
尽管学者们长期以来一直关注公民政治决策的质量,但我们仍然对公民为什么不同意社会上最灵通的意见,即公共政策专家的意见知之甚少。在这篇文章中,我研究了导致公民在公共政策问题上不同意专家意见的因素。我发现,精英线索和公民的个人层面属性都会导致个人与专家意见相左。与最近许多关于接受暗示的研究的预期相反,我发现,当他们支持的政治精英挑战专家意见时,公民更有可能不同意专家意见。由于知识水平低、现有的政策偏好和生活经验,公民也不同意专家的意见。这项研究的结果挑战了最近许多关于线索获取的研究的乐观结论,并认为在这些研究之前的传统智慧具有重要的价值。精英暗示并不是有效政策判断的一贯手段。相反,在制定有效的政策决策方面,没有什么可以替代知识。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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