Do Bureaucrats Change Their Behavior During Electoral Cycles? The Effect of Local Elections on Crackdown Rates on Illegal Parking

Abstract

Although there is vast literature on whether and how bureaucratic decision-making is changed according to the policy preference of elected officials, we know little about whether bureaucratic decision-making is also influenced by the electoral incentive of elected officials. To understand the effect of electoral incentives on bureaucratic behavior, this study uses the case of the city mayor election and its effect on local governments’ crackdown rates on illegal parking. Specifically, this study evaluates whether and how local governments’ crackdown rates on illegal parking changes before and after the reelection of incumbent mayors and whether changes in those rates are more prominent with competitive reelections. Analyses show no evidence that mayors’ electoral cycles and competitiveness significantly influence crackdown rates on illegal parking. This finding is evidence that bureaucrats’ decision-making is not influenced by their elected superiors if that influence is to enhance their elected superior’s chance of winning at reelection, which implies that political influence on bureaucratic behavior can be shown differently according to the reason behind politicians’ influence.