Security Coordinated Economic Dispatch for Joint Energy and Reserve Markets

Abstract

In power markets, SO can maintain system security by preventively restraining the energy transactions or, if having procured sufficient reserves, by dispatching the reserves correctively after any contingency happens. The traditional security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) or economic dispatch (SCED), being with all the contingency constraints, probably leads to lower market efficiency. In this paper, a security coordinated economic dispatch (SCoED) model is presented for day-ahead energy and reserve joint market, which is formulated as a Stackelberg leader-follower problem, the upper level determining the energy and reserve procurement schedules subjecting to only the normal constraints while in the lower level, economic dispatch of the procured reserves is executed for every possible N-l contingency to maintain system security. A numerical example is carried out on a 6-bus system to compare the energy market efficiency and reserve procurement cost under the traditional SCED and the SCoED.