THE BEGINNING OF THE GENEVA TALKS. ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE AFGHAN CRISIS (1982 – 1984)

Abstract

Attempts at a diplomatic solution to the Afghan problem from 1982 to 1984 are examined based on a study of transcripts of plenary sessions of the UN General Assembly, reports of the UN Secretary-General, and documents of the US National Security Archive J. Washington and scientific literature. The article analyzes the activities of UN Secretary-General P. de Cuellar and his personal representative D. Cordoves in resolving the crisis in Afghanistan caused by the socialist experiment launched by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Particular attention is paid to the "Rhodes format" of the Afghan-Pakistani talks. Both delegations did not meet, and the arguments and positions of opponents were received from D. Cordoves, who took turns talking to representatives of both missions. The role of the USSR and the USA in the Geneva negotiation process is studied. After the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet Union was embroiled in a civil war in the DRA between the Soviet-backed NDPA regime and the majority-backed opposition and the United States, Pakistan, China, and other countries. During the Cold War, the Kremlin's actions became a stimulus to the United States, which turned Afghanistan into a significant factor in American foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the United States were not participants in the Afghan-Pakistani talks, but the constructive political dialogue depended on their positions. It turns out that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has become a hostage of the inter-bloc confrontation. The results of the three rounds of the Geneva talks are analyzed. During the negotiations, the parties managed to outline a range of issues that needed to be resolved: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DRA, the development of international guarantees and commitments not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the return of Afghan refugees. The negotiation process was slow, and the most crucial issue, the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, was not discussed. A study of transcripts of plenary sessions of the UN General Assembly showed that the strong condemnation of the aggressor's actions by the world community had no real impact on the situation in Afghanistan. The reason was that General Assembly resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were advisory and non-binding. The author concludes that the Afghan crisis has clearly highlighted the weaknesses of the UN, namely the lack of effective mechanisms to influence the aggressive policy of a member of the UN Security Council.